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Unmasking the Right of Publicity 
DUSTIN MARLAN† 
In the landmark 1953 case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Judge Jerome Frank first articulated 
the modern right of publicity as a transferable intellectual property right. The right of publicity has since been 
seen to protect the strictly commercial value of one’s “persona”—the Latin-derived word meaning the mask of an 
actor. Why might Judge Frank have been motivated to fashion a transferable right in the monetary value of one’s 
public persona distinct from the psychic harm to feelings, emotions, and dignity rooted in the individual and 
protected under the rubric of privacy?  
Judge Frank was a leading figure in the American legal realist movement known for his unique and controversial 
“psychoanalysis of certain legal traditions” through influential books including Law and the Modern Mind. His 
work drew heavily on the ideas of psychoanalytic thinkers, like Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, to describe the 
distorting effects of unconscious wishes and fantasies on the decision-making process of legal actors and judges. 
For Judge Frank, the psychoanalytic interplay between public and private aspects of the personality supported his 
realist interpretation of lawmaking as a subjective and indeterminate activity. Indeed, though Judge Frank 
provided little rationale for articulating a personality right separate from privacy in Haelan, he had given a 
tremendous amount of attention to the personality in his scholarly works.  
In considering Judge Frank’s psychoanalytic jurisprudence, this Article suggests that the modern right of 
publicity’s aim, apart from privacy law, may be usefully understood through the psychoanalytic conception of the 
personality—one divided into public and private subparts. In the psychoanalytic sense, the term persona, or “false 
self,” is used to indicate the public face of an individual—the image one presents to others for social or economic 
advantage—as contrasted with their feelings, emotions and subjective interpretations of reality anchored in their 
private shadow, or “true self.” Yet, the law’s continued reliance on this dualistic metaphor of the personality 
appears misguided, particularly as technology, internet, and social media increasingly blur the traditional 
distinctions between public and private.  
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INTRODUCTION  
The conventional image of the law is, of course, a mask, a false-face, made to 
suit unconscious childish desires. But that false-face terrifies even the persons 
who have made it. 
Jerome N. Frank1 
 
In the landmark 1953 case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Judge Jerome Frank first articulated the right of publicity as a 
transferable intellectual property right.2 However, that influential decision shed 
little light on the right’s conceptual boundaries or its proper justification.3 The 
right of publicity has since typically been seen to protect the commercial value 
of one’s “persona”4—the Latin-derived word originally meaning the mask of 
an actor.5 In part because the persona is an ethereal concept lacking an 
accepted meaning under the law,6 the right of publicity’s doctrinal scope has 
 
 1. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 175 (1930) [hereinafter FRANK, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND].  
 2. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (“This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’”); see also Fleer 
Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 658 F.2d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1981); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. 
SCHECHTER, 1 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.27, at 58 (2019) (referring to Judge Frank as 
“architect” of the right of publicity); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can 
Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1172–73 (2006); Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of 
Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1201 
(1986); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204, 218–23 (1954); cf. 
JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 67 (2018) (“A 
careful reading of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum indicates that it did not create anything new, 
but as more and more commentators claimed that the decision did, it was hard to put the genie back in the 
bottle.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan, Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum: Publicity as a Legal Right, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 17, 17–18 (2014) (“Given the 
magnitude of its impact, Haelan was a remarkably terse decision—skimpy in its discussion of precedent, short 
on normative rationale, and utterly lacking in an examination of potential consequences.”). 
 4. See, e.g., MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 2, at § 4:46, at 262; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We 
Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights 
of Publicity, 20 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 123, 125–26 (1996); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. 
the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 47 (1994) (“The right of 
publicity is a legal theory which enables individuals to protect themselves from unauthorized, commercial 
appropriations of their personas.”); see also cases cited infra note 46. 
 5. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLIOT, THE LITERARY PERSONA 20–21 (1982) (“Whatever the uncertainties 
about derivation, there is no question that, in Latin, persona refers originally to a device of transformation and 
concealment on the theatrical stage.”); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 957, 962 (1982) (noting that “‘person’ stems from the Latin persona, meaning, among other things, a 
theatrical role”). 
 6. See, e.g., Jeffrey Malkan, Stolen Photographs: Personality, Publicity, and Privacy, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
779, 829–35 (1997) (discussing the ambiguous nature of the term persona under right of publicity law); see 
also Rosina Zapparoni, Propertising Identity: Understanding the United States Right of Publicity and Its 
Implications—Some Lessons for Australia, 28 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 690, 710 (2004) (describing the persona 
as an “ephemeral” concept lacking a clear meaning under the law). 
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not been clearly articulated,7 and its theoretical grounding remains shaky.8 
Among other criticisms, the right of publicity is frequently accused of lacking 
a coherent justification, permitting only for economic redress against harms to 
the public persona, and stripping away individual identities by allowing for an 
alienable, proprietary right in one’s personality.9 Why might Judge Frank have 
been motivated to fashion a transferable intellectual property right in the 
monetary value of one’s objectified persona, or external image, distinct from 
the inner psychic or spiritual harm to feelings and dignity rooted in the 
individual and protected under the rubric of privacy?10 
Judge Frank was a leading figure in the American legal realist movement 
known for his unique and controversial “jurisprudence of therapy,” or 
“psychoanalysis of certain legal traditions,”11 through seminal works including 
Law and the Modern Mind,12 Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?,13 Courts on 
Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice,14 and Fate and Freedom: A 
Philosophy for Free Americans.15 His judicial philosophy drew heavily on the 
ideas of then-cutting edge psychoanalytic thinkers, like Sigmund Freud,16 Jean 
Piaget,17 and Carl Jung,18 to describe the distorting effects of unconscious 
wishes and fantasies on the decision-making process of legal actors and 
 
 7. See, e.g., Eric E. Johnson, Disentangling the Right of Publicity, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 891, 892 (2017); 
Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask that Eats into the Face: Images and the Right of Publicity, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
157, 158–59 (2015) [hereinafter Tushnet, A Mask that Eats]; Rebecca Tushnet, Raising Walls Against 
Overlapping Rights: Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1541 (2017). 
 8. See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 
383, 388 (1999); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 
81 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 173–74 (1993); Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-
Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 230 (2005). 
 9. See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 8, at 388; Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 
101 GEO. L.J. 185, 186–91 (2012). 
 10. See, e.g., 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:6 
(2017) (explaining that misappropriation “centers on damage to human dignity” while “the right of publicity 
relates to commercial damage to the business value of human identity”); Danielle Keats Citron, The Roots of 
Sexual Privacy: Warren and Brandeis & the Privacy of Intimate Life, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS. 383, 384–87 
(2019) (“As Warren and Brandeis explained, privacy involved the spiritual. It was not about material economic 
or physical harm. . . . [h]ence the difference in the right to publicity, which concerns financial harm and the 
market value of one’s identity.” (footnote omitted)).  
 11. Neil Duxbury, Jerome Frank and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 18 J.L. & SOC’Y 175, 180 (1991); cf. 
Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 269 
(1997). 
 12. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND supra note 1. 
 13. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933). 
 14. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949) [hereinafter 
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL]. 
 15. JEROME FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM: A PHILOSOPHY FOR FREE AMERICANS (1945) [hereinafter 
FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM]. 
 16. See id. at 64; FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 1, at 359; see also infra Part II. 
 17. See FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 164; FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra 
note 1, at 117, 164, 201. 
 18. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 14, at 395–96. 
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judges.19 For Judge Frank, the psychoanalytic interplay between disparate parts 
of the personality supported the realist interpretation of judging as a highly 
subjective and indeterminate activity.20  
To this end, Judge Frank believed the “basic legal myth” is that the 
“Father-as-Infallible-Judge” simply deduces objective legal conclusions from 
rules.21 He argued, rather, that judges arrive at decisions based largely on the 
subjective influences of their individual personalities.22 For Judge Frank, “[t]he 
conventional image of the law,”—that law is objective and precise—is “a 
mask, a false-face, made to suit unconscious childish desires.”23 And Judge 
Frank’s judicial philosophy was concerned with distinguishing between what 
he labeled the public-private dichotomy, in effect the “internal and external, 
psychical and physical, mind and body, subjective and objective.”24 Indeed, 
though Judge Frank provided little rationale for articulating a personality right 
apart from privacy in Haelan, he had given a tremendous amount of attention 
to the personality in his scholarly works.  
In considering Judge Frank’s psychoanalytic jurisprudence, this Article 
suggests that the modern right of publicity’s aim, apart from privacy law, may be 
usefully understood through the psychoanalytic conception of the personality—
one divided into public and private subparts. In this sense, the term persona, or 
“false self,” refers to an individual’s social façade or front that reflects the role 
in life the individual is playing.25 Distinct from an inner shadow, or “true self,” 
the psychoanalytic persona designates only the aspect of the personality that 
one presents to the world in public to gain social approval or economic 
advantage: “a kind of mask, designed on one hand to make a definite 
impression upon others, and on the other to conceal the true nature of the 
individual.”26 Indeed, as a “metaphor of the actor and his mask,” the 
psychoanalytic persona is used “to indicate the public self of the individual, the 
image he presents to others, as contrasted with his feelings, cognition, and 
 
 19. See, e.g., Archie Zariski, Sympathy and Empathy in Therapeutic Jurisprudence from a 
Psychoanalytic Perspective: From Freud to Posner and Beyond, 1 INT’L J. THERAPEUTIC JURIS. 291, 300 
(2016). 
 20. Anne C. Dailey, Imagination and Choice, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 175, 180 (2010). 
 21. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND supra note 1, at 18, 20; see also, e.g., Julius Paul, Jerome 
Frank’s Attack on the “Myth” of Legal Certainty, 36 NEB. L. REV 547, 548, 554 (1957). 
 22. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND supra note 1, at 111. 
 23. Id. at 175. 
 24. Id. at 77. 
 25. C. G. JUNG, PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES OR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDIVIDUATION 268 (1923). 
 26. C. G. Jung, The Persona and the Collective Unconscious, in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF C. G. 
JUNG: TWO ESSAYS IN ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 127, 192 (R. F.C. Hull trans., Herbert Read, et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 1966); cf. ERIC BERNE, TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: A SYSTEMATIC INDIVIDUAL AND 
SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 79 (1961); D. W. Winnicott, Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self, in THE 
MATURATIONAL PROCESS AND THE FACILITATING ENVIRONMENT: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF EMOTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 140, 140–57 (1965). 
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interpretations of reality anchored in his private self.”27 This parallels the legal 
divide between the right of publicity and the right of privacy. 
However, the conceptual usefulness of such a dualistic metaphor of the 
self28—one sharply divided into internal (private) and external (public) 
spheres—is being called into question amidst a growing technology, internet, 
and social media-driven need for interwoven rights of privacy and publicity.29 
In Jennifer Rothman’s recent book, The Right of Publicity: Privacy 
Reimagined for a Public World, she imagines privacy and publicity as 
intertwined rights, “protecting individuals’ identities rather than protecting a 
separable, purely economic interest.”30 As Rothman puts it, the “[d]istinctions 
between public and private figures make little sense today as so-called private 
figures increasingly live public or quasi-public lives on Instagram, Twitter, 
Facebook, Pinterest, Periscope, and other online fora.”31  
Given this heightened need for intertwined rights of privacy and 
publicity, this Article suggests that the law’s continued theoretical reliance on 
a dualistic metaphor of the personality is misguided, and instead, looks to 
intersubjective personality theory. Intersubjectivity provides publicity law with 
a useful conceptual update given its view of the personality as a relational, 
contextual, and social construct, rather than a public-private dichotomy. An 
intersubjective conception of the self is consistent with theoretical accounts of 
the self put forth by leading privacy theorists.32 Intersubjectivity emphasizes 
embodied experiences and social relations between individuals as integral to 
the development of the genuine personality, not as a public façade distinct 
from an underlying private self.33  
Unlike in traditional psychoanalytic thought (and current personality 
rights jurisprudence), intersubjectivity does not view individuals “as trying to 
hide or dress themselves up.”34 “Public” and “private” are rather regarded as 
metaphors that may be helpful in understanding some individuals in some 
situations, some of the time.35 Recasting the right of publicity through an 
intersubjective lens highlights the right’s role in protecting the personas of 
everyday citizens—not just celebrities—especially in the digital and social 
media context where users’ personas have value in the data economy. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the right 
of publicity as a right protecting the commercial and economic value of an 
 
 27. CHRISTOPHER F. MONTE, BENEATH THE MASK: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF PERSONALITY 20 
(2d ed. 1980).  
 28. For purposes of this discussion, this Article treats the terms “self” and “personality” as equivalents.  
 29. See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF 
EVERYDAY PRACTICE 107–52 (2012). See generally ROTHMAN, supra note 2. 
 30. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 183. 
 31. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 183. 
 32. See infra Subpart V.B.  
 33. See infra Part V. 
 34. See PETER BUIRSKI & PAMELA HAGLUND, MAKING SENSE TOGETHER: THE INTERSUBJECTIVE 
APPROACH TO PSYCHOTHERAPY 4 (2001). 
 35. Id. at 14. 
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individual’s “persona” as distinct from privacy’s focus on personal harms to 
feelings, emotion, and dignity. This bifurcation between privacy and publicity 
was first articulated in Judge Frank’s Haelan decision. Part II attempts to 
weave a plausible psychological origin story of the right of publicity by 
looking to Judge Frank’s psychoanalytic jurisprudence. It suggests that Judge 
Frank—consciously or unconsciously—might have influenced the right of 
publicity’s proprietary turn based on his own psychoanalytic understanding of 
a fragmented personality divided into internal and external spheres. Part III, in 
turn, examines the divided model of the personality common to traditional 
psychoanalysis through both Freudian and Jungian lenses. Part IV explores the 
practical and theoretical consequences of the right of publicity’s current 
external, objective, and commercial focus, as exemplified by the actor’s mask 
metaphor. Part V discusses intersubjective personality theory, explores 
theoretical accounts of intersubjectivity among privacy law scholars, and, 
before concluding, examines one potential application of intersubjectivity for 
publicity in the realm of personal public spaces such as social media. 
I.  THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S IDENTITY CRISIS 
The right of publicity is often considered in connection with the typically 
superficial nature of its landmark cases. From chewing gum,36 to parody 
trading cards,37 to human cannonballs,38 to Dracula,39 to video games featuring 
professional athletes,40 to Eagles band member Don Henley-branded Henley 
shirts,41 to Johnny Carson-themed portable toilets,42 to a robot version of 
Vanna White,43 and the list goes on and on.44 However, as a right governing 
 
 36. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953) (involving rival 
chewing gum manufacturers). 
 37. Cardtoons, Ltd. Co. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 962 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(involving parody trading cards featuring active major league baseball players). 
 38. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563–64 (1977) (involving a human 
cannonball performance that was broadcasted in its entirety on the news). 
 39. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 427–28 (Cal. 1979) (involving the rights of an actor who 
had played Count Dracula in the 1927 Deane-Balderston Broadway play). 
 40. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2013) (involving the former quarterback of 
Rutgers and the NCAA Football videogame); Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(involving the former quarterback of Arizona State University and the NCAA Football videogame). 
 41. Henley v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 589 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (“Sometimes Don tucks it 
in; other times he wears it loose⎯it looks great either way. Don loves his Henley; you will too.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 42. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 832–33 (6th Cir. 1983) (involving the 
use of a former late-night television host’s name and persona as a pun on portable toilets). 
 43. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving the use of an ad 
using a robot dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry that resembled White’s hair and dress). 
 44. Other prominent right of publicity cases include Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (focusing on the “protectability of the voice” of Bette Midler used in a Ford commercial without her 
consent); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003) (involving well-known performers, Johnny and 
Edgar Winter, suing DC Comics for using aspects of their likenesses in “Autumn Brothers” comic book 
characters); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800–01 (Cal. 2001) (involving 
lithographs and t-shirts bearing the likeness of The Three Stooges); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 
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the personality, it takes on a hidden depth and complexity when closely 
scrutinized. This Part first examines the right of publicity as a right governing 
the value of one’s commercial “persona.” It then examines the influence of 
Judge Frank’s Haelan decision on the conceptualization of the right of 
publicity as an alienable intellectual property right to control the commercial 
value of one’s “persona,” distinct from the right to privacy’s focus on 
protecting dignity, emotions, and feelings.  
A. THE COMMERCIAL PERSONA  
There exists no federally legislated right of publicity. Rather, the right has 
been adopted by either judicial decision or by statute in the majority of states.45 
While varying state to state, the common law right of publicity is now widely 
seen as the right to control the commercial use and value of one’s persona.46 
The right of publicity generally requires three elements to be actionable: (1) 
use of an individual’s persona; (2) for commercial purposes; and (3) without 
plaintiff’s consent. However, the proper definition of “persona” is unclear and 
typically considered some combination of the economic value in not just one’s 
name or likeness, but also one’s image—and “image” is not just what a person 
looks like, but also includes audiences’ beliefs about that person.47  
While the persona has been described in the case law as “the essence of 
the person,”48 it is usually regarded for right of publicity purposes as the 
strictly public image of the person. One judge’s view is that the right of 
publicity “protects the persona—the public image that makes people want to 
identify with the object person, and thereby imbues his name or likeness with 
commercial value marketable to those that seek such identification.”49 The 
right of publicity, according to one appellate court, “protects against the 
unauthorized appropriation of an individual’s very persona which would result 
 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 401–03 (2011) (involving rock band, No Doubt, suing video game publisher, Activision, for 
featuring computer-generated images of band members in video game, Band Hero). 
 45. As of 2019, thirty-eight states have some form of common law precedent, while twenty-four states 
have a right of publicity statute. See Statutes and Interactive Map, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, 
https://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).  
 46. See, e.g., Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he tort of misappropriation of name 
or likeness protects a person’s persona. A persona does not fall within the subject matter of copyright.”); 
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 289 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“The right of 
publicity . . . protects against the unauthorized appropriation of an individual’s very persona which would 
result in unearned commercial gain to another.”); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978) (“The distinctive aspect of the common law right of publicity is that it recognizes the commercial value 
of the picture or representation of a prominent person or performer, and protects his proprietary interest in the 
profitability of his public reputation or ‘persona.’”); Onassis v. Christian Dior-N.Y, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 
260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), aff’d, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (The New York statute “is intended 
to protect the essence of the person, his or her identity or persona from being unwillingly or unknowingly 
misappropriated for the profit of another.”). 
 47. Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask that Eats, supra note 7, at 158. 
 48. Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 260. 
 49. Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), opinion 
supplemented, 578 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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in unearned commercial gain to another.”50 Another court defines it as “public 
reputation.”51 
Adding to the confusion is the rhetoric of the term “persona” itself. 
Author of the leading treatise on publicity law, J. Thomas McCarthy, explains 
that the word persona has a semantic problem in the right of publicity context 
given that it presents two distinct meanings—(1) the commercial persona and 
(2) the human persona. McCarthy writes: 
(1) “Persona” describes that bundle of commercial values embodied in 
the “identity” of a person. A “persona” has commercial value in that it can 
attract consumers’ attention to an advertisement or product. In creating a 
right of publicity, the law recognizes the existence of this economic reality; 
and  
(2) “Persona” describes in a single word the various ways by which a 
human being can be identified. . . . “The right of publicity comprises a 
person’s right to own, protect and commercially exploit his own name, 
likeness and persona.” A more terse definition would be that the right of 
publicity protects a human persona—period.52  
And the Merriam-Webster dictionary, for instance, defines persona in 
multiple ways, each potentially relevant in the context of a personality right: 
(1) “a character assumed by an author in a written work”; (2) “from Latin,” 
either (a) “an individual’s social facade or front that especially in the analytic 
psychology of C. G. Jung reflects the role in life the individual is playing” or 
(b) “the personality that a person (such as an actor or politician) projects in 
public: image”; or (3) “a character in a fictional presentation (such as a novel 
or play).”53 
Confusion over what the persona means tends to manifest in both 
common law decisions and states’ legislative drafting of the right. Some states 
interpret persona narrowly and others more expansively. For example, 
Indiana’s statute refers to the property interest in a personality’s “(1) name, (2) 
voice, (3) signature, (4) photograph, (5) image, (6) likeness, (7) distinctive 
appearance, (8) gestures, or (9) mannerisms.”54 Virginia, in contrast, limits the 
right of publicity to name or picture.55 While publicity was initially limited to 
protecting one’s name and likeness, “a broader concept arose” following Judge 
Frank’s Haelan decision, “one often referred to as a ‘persona.’”56 And such use 
of one’s persona leads to greater liability than for using their name or likeness 
 
 50. Factors Etc., 652 F.2d at 289 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 51. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 728 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977)). 
 52. MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 2, at § 4:46 (footnotes omitted). 
 53. See Persona, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/persona (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). The Jungian definition, 2(a), will be explored 
further in Part III, as especially relevant given Judge Frank’s psychoanalytic approach to understanding the 
law. See infra Part II. 
 54. IND. CODE § 32-36-1-6 (2019).  
 55. See, e.g., WJLA-TV v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 395 (Va. 2002). 
 56. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 89. 
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given that it encompasses any and all use or evocation of a person’s outward 
identity.57  
To illustrate the breadth of the right of publicity’s protection of the 
commercial persona—as distinct from a narrower focus on name, picture, or 
likeness—consider three seminal examples from the case law.  
Midler v. Ford Motor Company involved the protectability of famed 
actress and singer Bette Midler’s unique voice. Here, Ford Motor Company 
and its advertising agency used a sound alike of Midler on a television 
commercial, and Midler sued for a violation of her right of publicity.58 
Notably, neither Midler’s name nor picture was used in the commercials. 
While Midler’s song, “Do You Want To Dance,” was used, Ford’s advertising 
agency had properly licensed the copyright for it.59 At issue was only the 
nature of Midler’s voice in that the sound-alike, who was hired after Midler 
refused to participate, “sounded exactly” like Midler’s recorded version of the 
song.60 In siding with Midler, the Ninth Circuit held that: 
[W]hen a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is 
deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated 
what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California. Midler has made 
a showing, sufficient to defeat summary judgment, that the defendants here 
for their own profit in selling their product did appropriate part of her 
identity.61 
Therefore, Midler’s commercial persona was protected, even despite her own 
individual lack of participation in the advertisement.  
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets involved a lawsuit by Johnny 
Carson, former host and star of “The Tonight Show.”62 Throughout Carson’s 
decades-long tenure on The Tonight Show, he was introduced each night with 
the phrase “Here’s Johnny,” for which he became widely known.63 The 
defendant, Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. rented and sold “Here’s 
Johnny” portable toilets, and, clearly aware of Carson’s use of the phrase, 
coupled this with the phrase “The World’s Foremost Commodian.”64 In 
holding for Carson, the Sixth Circuit stated:  
The right of publicity . . . is that a celebrity has a protected pecuniary 
interest in the commercial exploitation of his identity. If the celebrity’s 
identity is commercially exploited, there has been an invasion of his right 
whether or not his “name or likeness” is used. Carson’s identity may be 
exploited even if his name, John W. Carson, or his picture is not used.65 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Midler v. Ford Motor Company, 849 F.2d 460, 461–62 (9th Cir. 1988). The soundalike was Ula 
Hedwig, who was a longtime backup singer for Midler. Id. 
 59. Id. at 460. 
 60. Id. at 462. 
 61. Id. at 463–64. 
 62. 698 F.2d 831, 832–33 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 835. 
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Thus, Johnny Carson’s phrase “Here’s Johnny” was protected based on its 
mere association with his commercial persona. 
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. involved a dispute over an 
advertisement by Samsung for video cassette recorders that depicted a robot 
dressed in a gown, wig, and jewelry.66 The robot was designed to resemble 
current “Wheel of Fortune” host Vanna White, and the “caption of the ad read: 
‘Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D.’”67 White sued Samsung, and the 
Ninth Circuit held in her favor: 
The robot is standing on what looks to be the Wheel of Fortune game show 
set. Vanna White dresses like this, turns letters, and does this on the Wheel 
of Fortune game show. She is the only one. Indeed, defendants themselves 
referred to their ad as the “Vanna White” ad. We are not surprised.  
Television and other media create marketable celebrity identity value. 
Considerable energy and ingenuity are expended by those who have 
achieved celebrity value to exploit for profit. The law protects the 
celebrity’s sole right to exploit this value whether the celebrity has achieved 
her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a combination thereof.68 
As such, White prevailed despite the robotic depiction of her commercial 
persona. 
These cases illustrate that the right of publicity is a broad right capable of 
encompassing not just one’s name and likeness, but also the commercial 
persona—one’s objectified image as a commodity distinct from any emphasis 
on inner and subjective feelings and emotions. The next Subpart focuses on 
how such a personality right arose at common law.  
B. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY 
Today, the right of publicity and the right of privacy are considered 
opposites; publicity is thought to be “the reverse side of the coin of privacy.”69 
However, the rights were originally intertwined.70 Privacy, especially the tort 
of commercial appropriation of identity, has long focused not just on privacy in 
solitude, but also privacy in public.71 That is, even before a formal right of 
 
 66. 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 67. Id. It is now 2020 A.D. and the real Vanna White is still hosting the original human version of Wheel 
of Fortune. Her contract has been extended until 2022. Lesley Golberg, Alex Trebek, Pat Sajak, Vanna White 
Renew Contracts Through 2022, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 31, 2018, 12:05 PM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/alex-trebek-pat-sajak-vanna-white-renew-contracts-2022-
1156793.  
 68. White, 971 F.2d at 1399. 
 69. Nimmer, supra note 2, at 204; see also Jennifer E. Rothman, The Right of Publicity’s Intellectual 
Property Turn, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277, 287 (2019).  
 70. Rothman, supra note 69, at 287.  
 71. While Haelan popularized the concept of the right of publicity, it was not the first court to coin the 
term “right of publicity,” despite often being credited as doing so. The term was used, rather, at least as early 
as 1905, although to describe the public aspect of privacy rather than any formal publicity right under the 
common law. See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905) (“Publicity in one instance, 
and privacy in the other, are each guarantied. If personal liberty embraces the right of publicity, it no less 
embraces the correlative right of privacy, and this is no new idea in Georgia law.” (emphasis added)). 
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publicity developed at common law, privacy was focused on the right to 
control one’s “publicity,” or how and when one’s name or picture could be 
used by others in public.72 Privacy law was developed, at least in part, to ward 
off “unwarranted publicity” in response to the advent of the portable camera, 
which enabled widespread commercial exploitation.73 Several cases, beginning 
as early as the late 1800s, involved the nonconsensual use of names and photos 
of random individuals, typically on products and in advertisements.74 
Performers objected to the taking of their names, images, and photographs 
without permission in newspapers and promotions,75 typically recovering 
damages for dignitary and emotional—but sometimes also economic—
harms.76  
Common law privacy can be traced back at least as far as Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis’s seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The Right to 
Privacy.77 There, consistent with the challenges faced in that era, Warren and 
Brandeis articulated the normative bases for a right intended to protect the 
press from publishing private facts and photographs.78 They wrote: 
The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, 
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be 
communicated to others. . . . The existence of this right does not depend on 
the particular method of expression adopted. . . . The right is lost only when 
the author himself communicates his production to the public—in other 
words, publishes it.79 
It was not until 1960, however, that William Prosser’s seminal article, 
simply titled Privacy, carved four distinct causes of action out of the still-
developing doctrine.80 As Prosser summarizes: 
 
 72. See Samantha Barbas, From Privacy to Publicity: The Tort of Appropriation in the Age of Mass 
Consumption, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2013). 
 73. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 12–13, 27. 
 74. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1942) (involving the use of a 
famous football player’s photograph on advertisement for beer); Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70 (involving plaintiff’s 
picture on advertisement for insurance); Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographing Co., 182 N.Y.S. 428, 429–30 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1920) (involving plaintiff’s picture being used without her consent for an advertisement for a 
film in New York City); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 442 (N.Y. 1902) (involving 
plaintiff finding her picture on an ad for Franklin Mills flour); Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg., Co., 67 A. 
392, 392 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (involving appropriation of Thomas A. Edison’s name and likeness for use in 
labeling of pharmaceuticals). 
 75. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 74; cf. Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, 
Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 
1328 (2002) (“The right of publicity had its origins in a body of tort law that was designed to protect personal 
privacy.”).  
 76. See generally Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the 
Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 229 (1999). 
 77. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890). 
 78. Cf. Charles E. Colman, About Ned, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 128, 133 (2016) (exploring the possibility 
that Warren’s motivation for writing The Right to Privacy may have been about his drive to protect his 
younger siblings, especially his gay brother Ned). 
 79. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 77, at 198–200 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 80. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); see also Neil M. Richards & Daniel 
J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1890 (2010) (noting that, beyond 
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What has emerged from the decisions is no simple matter. It is not one 
tort, but a complex of four. The law of privacy comprises four distinct 
kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied 
together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in 
common except that each represents an interference with the right of the 
plaintiff, in the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, “to be let alone.”81 
To this end, Prosser described four separate torts: (1) intrusion upon the 
plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his or her private affairs;82 (2) public 
disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff;83 (3) false light in 
the public eye;84 and (4) appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the 
plaintiff’s name or likeness.85 While the first three torts focus on emotional 
harm to the subject, the fourth alludes to Judge Frank’s articulation of a “right 
of publicity” seven years prior in the 1953 Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision.86 
In Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Judge Frank recognized 
for the first time an alienable licensing right in the commercial value of an 
objectified image—or in other words, a persona—as distinct from the non-
assignable right to privacy.87 In what was really a breach of contract case, 
Haelan held that a professional baseball player could sell to a third party the 
exclusive right to use his image on baseball cards.88 In effect, Haelan was the 
first case to recognize a licensable right in the personality. 
The facts involved the plaintiff (Haelan), a chewing gum manufacturer, 
entering into a contract with a baseball player providing Haelan with the 
exclusive right to use the player’s photographs to be sold in connection with 
Haelan’s chewing gum during the term of the contract.89 Defendant (Topps), a 
rival chewing gum manufacturer who knew of the contract between Haelan 
and the baseball player, deliberately induced the baseball player to contract 
with Topps to use the player’s same photograph during the term of Haelan’s 
 
Prosser’s 1960 California Law Review article, Prosser was engaged with tort privacy scholarship from the 
1940s until his death in 1972; and providing a critical assessment of Prosser’s legacy in that regard). 
 81. Prosser, supra note 80, at 389 (footnotes omitted). 
 82. Id. at 389–92. 
 83. Id. at 392–98. 
 84. Id. at 398–401. 
 85. Id. at 401–06. 
 86. Id. at 406–07 (“[Appropriation’s] proprietary nature is clearly indicated by a decision of the Second 
Circuit that an exclusive license has what has been called a ‘right of publicity,’ which entitles him to enjoin the 
use of the name or likeness by a third person. Although [Haelan] has not yet been followed, it would seem 
clearly to be justified.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 87. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). See, e.g., Brian L. Frye, Incidental Intellectual Property, 33 ENT. & 
SPORTS LAW. 24, 27 (2017) (“[T]he Second Circuit effectively created a new kind of intellectual property, the 
‘right of publicity,’ which gives people an alienable right in the commercial use of their name and likeness. 
After Haelan, not only could people prevent the commercial use of their name and likeness without their 
permission, but also they could transfer the right to control the commercial use of their name and likeness to 
someone else.”). 
 88. 202 F.2d at 869. 
 89. Id. at 867. 
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contract.90 The baseball player then contracted with Topps for the photograph 
during the designated term of Haelan’s exclusive contract.91  
When Haelan sued, Topps countered that “the contract with plaintiff was 
no more than a release by the ball-player to plaintiff of the liability which, 
absent the release, plaintiff would have incurred in using the ball-player’s 
photograph, because such a use, without his consent, would be an invasion of 
his right of privacy.”92 And, under New York law, “this statutory right of 
privacy is personal, not assignable; therefore, plaintiff’s contract vested in 
plaintiff no ‘property’ right or other legal interest which defendant’s conduct 
invaded.”93 
Judge Frank, along with Judge Clark and Chief Judge Swan 
(concurring),94 held that the privacy statute did not limit Haelan’s rights.95 
Rather, the Second Circuit found that New York recognized an independent 
common law right protecting commercial interests in contrast to the personal 
and emotional ones protected under privacy.96 Moreover, such a right was 
assignable, thus granting Haelan—who did not hold the baseball player’s non-
transferable right of privacy—a cause of action.97  
Indeed, Judge Frank considered publicity and privacy as separate 
interests. According to Judge Frank: 
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which 
in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value 
of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of 
publishing his picture, and that such a grant may be validly made “in gross” 
i.e., without any accompanying transfer of a business or of anything 
else. . . . This right might be called a “right of publicity.” For it is common 
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of 
their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received 
money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, 
displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.98  
To be sure, Judge Frank had a practical reason for articulating a publicity 
right in this circumstance. Privacy rights, as non-severable from the right-
holder, could not accommodate a transferable cause of action for the plaintiff 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. In looking at the letters and internal memoranda exchanged in the case, it seems that Judge Clark 
contributed only rather minor edits and suggestions to Judge Frank’s written opinion, though documents 
alluded to the fact that they had discussed the matter in some detail orally. Special thanks to the Lillian 
Goldman Law Library at Yale Law School where the Jerome Frank papers are archived. Jennifer Rothman has 
drawn some additional conclusions from the Haelan case record, pertaining especially to Judge Clark’s 
potential motive for fashioning a right of publicity separate from privacy. See ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 59–
62; Rothman, supra note 69, at 286–88. 
 95. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868–89. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 868 (emphasis added).  
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based on the plaintiff’s contract to use celebrity baseball players’ likenesses in 
connection with the sale of chewing gum. Yet Judge Frank need not have 
created a new intellectual property right to hold Topps liable. Judge Swan had 
concurred in the judgment insofar as the opinion “deals with the defendant’s 
liability for intentionally inducing a ball-player to breach a contract which gave 
plaintiff the exclusive privilege of using his picture.”99 Thus, the Second 
Circuit’s analysis could have sounded entirely in tort or contract law and 
achieved a similar result. But it went much further. 
Judge Frank’s opinion also gives little useful insight as to his rationale for 
articulating a licensable “right of publicity” beyond the following cursory 
description: 
[A] man has no legal interest in the publication of his picture other than his 
right of privacy, i.e., a personal and non-assignable right not to have his 
feelings hurt by such a publication. . . . We think that, in addition to and 
independent of that right of privacy (which in New York derives from 
statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the 
right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such 
a grant may validly be made “in gross,” i.e., without an accompanying 
transfer of a business or of anything else. Whether it be labelled a 
“property” right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag 
“property” simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has 
pecuniary worth.100 
Judge Frank’s analysis has been much maligned by commentators. Stacey 
Dogan has written that “[g]iven the magnitude of its impact, Haelan was a 
remarkably terse decision—skimpy in its discussion of precedent, short on 
normative rationale, and utterly lacking in an examination of potential 
consequences.”101 Haelan, in effect, “created a sort of rogue intellectual 
property right, lacking internal limits and disciplined only by the intervention 
of the First Amendment.”102 Michael Madow notes that Judge Frank offered no 
rationale for the right of publicity beyond that celebrities who were denied 
image revenues would “feel sorely deprived,” failed to evaluate the potential 
costs of such a right, and that his opinion “contained not a trace of moral or 
conceptual uneasiness about the commodification of personality.”103 And, as 
Sheldon Halpern puts it, it was “natural and obvious to the court that celebrity 
personas should be treated as garden variety commodities, to be bought and 
sold in the market like any other.”104  
While the Second Circuit, as a federal court, did not actually have the 
power to change New York law,105 its description of the right of publicity as 
independent of privacy has proven extremely influential. In fact, despite its 
 
 99. Id. at 869 (Swan, J., concurring). 
 100. Id. at 868 (emphasis added). 
 101. DOGAN, supra note 3, at 17–18. 
 102. Id. at 18. 
 103. Madow, supra note 8, at 173. 
 104. Id. at 174. 
 105. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 69, at 287. 
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flaws, the Haelan formulation caught on as “the principal support for the 
doctrine that the right of publicity protects a distinct economic interest in 
personality.”106 After Judge Frank’s articulation, Melville Nimmer’s 1954 law 
review article, called The Right of Publicity, theorized a dichotomy between 
privacy and publicity.107 He called the right of publicity the “reverse side” of 
privacy, conceptualizing a public right in excess of privacy and unfair 
competition.108 Nimmer argued that privacy law: 
[I]s not adequate to meet the demands of the second half of the twentieth 
century . . . . With the tremendous strides in communications, advertising, 
and entertainment techniques, the public personality has found that the use 
of his name, photograph, and likeness has taken on a pecuniary value 
undreamed of at the turn of the century.109 
And courts began to take to this “Cartesian dualism” between privacy and 
publicity. In 1956, for instance, the Third Circuit remarked: 
[W]e think the reader will conclude, as do we, that the word of power most 
frequently employed by the courts is either “privacy” or “property,” the 
latter usage being not infrequently colored by the contract rights of a 
performer or of an entrepreneur.  
There are, speaking very generally, two polar types of cases. One arises 
when some accidental occurrence rends the veil of obscurity surrounding an 
average person and makes him, arguably, newsworthy. The other type 
involves the appropriation of the performance or production of a 
professional performer or entrepreneur.110  
And the Second Circuit, for example, noted that: 
It is evident that courts address intrusions on feelings, reputation and 
privacy only when an individual has elected not to engage in personal 
commercialization. By contrast, when a ‘persona’ is in effect a product, and 
when that product has already been marketed to good advantage, the 
appropriation by another of that valuable property has more to do with 
unfair competition than it does with the right to be left alone.111  
Indeed, privacy rights came to serve as a “vehicle for the protection of an 
internal interest, the feelings of one who involuntarily has been publicly 
‘used.’”112 Put differently, a “subjective, emotional harm flowing from 
exposure.”113 As one court described it, “[r]elief is available under the 
applicable privacy law only for acts that invade plaintiffs’ privacy and 
consequently bruise their feelings . . . . [I]ts primary purpose . . . is to protect 
 
 106. Halpern, supra note 2, at 1202. 
 107. See generally Nimmer, supra note 2. 
 108. Id. at 204. 
 109. Id. at 203–04 (emphasis added). 
 110. Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 486 (3d Cir. 1956) (footnotes omitted). 
 111. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff’d., Factors Etc., 
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 112. Halpern, supra note 2, at 1204 (emphasis added). 
 113. Id. at 1205. 
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the feelings and privacy of the ‘little man.’”114 As Jennifer Rothman, who 
takes issue with the consensus view that Haelan coined or created the right of 
publicity, puts it: 
A careful reading of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum indicates 
that it did not create anything new, but as more and more commentators 
claimed that the decision did, it was hard to put the genie back in the 
bottle. . . . [O]ver the decades that followed Haelan, parties advocating for 
an expansive, transferable property-like right, distinct from the right of 
privacy, began to prevail in many states, particularly in federal courts 
applying their best guess about what state courts might decide about their 
own states’ laws. The right of publicity then exploded across the country 
and expanded in scope far beyond what even its initial proponents had 
advocated.115 
Thus, though the right of publicity developed in “a kind of analytical 
fog,”116 it has come to be widely interpreted as a property right protecting 
strictly commercial interests rather than rights personal to an individual. As 
Alice Haemmerli explains, the doctrines of privacy and publicity following 
Haelan “developed in a schizoid manner: publicity rights were purely 
economic property rights, as distinct from ‘personal’ privacy rights.”117 On the 
other hand, the cause of action in a privacy case, also following Haelan, came 
to be regarded entirely as internal, concerning only mental harm, or “one’s 
own peace of mind.”118 Even injury to one’s “character or reputation,” which 
had previously been allowed, would not suffice.119 Rather, only a “direct 
wrong of a personal character resulting in injury to the feelings without regard 
to any effect which the publication may have on the property, business, 
pecuniary interest, or the standing of the individual in the community.”120 
And in 1977, the Supreme Court affirmed the Haelan interpretation of the 
right of publicity as an intellectual property right in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co. In Zacchini, the Court held that the press has no 
constitutional right to broadcast a performer’s entire fifteen second “human 
cannonball” act without consent or compensation.121 The Court remarked that 
publicity rights, like patent and copyright law, have “little to do 
 
 114. Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting Lugosi v. 
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 443 n.23 (Cal. 1979)). 
 115. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 67. Rothman distinguishes between “privacy in public,” privacy in 
private, and the “right of publicity.” Id. at 11–12.  
 116. Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and 
Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, 2 (1985). 
 117. Haemmerli, supra note 8, at 407. 
 118. Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955). 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. (emphasis added). 
 121. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563–64, 572 (1977) (holding that the 
news broadcasting of petitioner’s “human cannonball” performer’s entire fifteen-second long act, while in the 
public interest, did not immunize defendant, news media, from civil liability concerning violation of 
petitioner’s right of publicity); see also Douglas G. Baird, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 1192–94 (1978) (noting that the 
Zacchini decision was based on the justification of promoting economic incentives, like copyright law).  
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with . . . feelings or reputation.”122 Instead, broadcasting “a film of petitioner’s 
entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic value of that 
performance.”123 Thus, following Zacchini, a “harm to feelings” publicity 
claim would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s articulation of the right 
of publicity as a freestanding intellectual property right built upon an economic 
incentives-based rationale.124 Rothman writes regarding this point: 
The Second Circuit, in Haelan, suggested (even if unintentionally) the 
possibility of a transferable right, and the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed and 
expanded this right to encompass performance rights, and to stand up 
against the First Amendment rights even in a news broadcast. By the end of 
the 1970s, the right of publicity was well established as an independent 
right—primarily framed as an exclusionary property right similar to 
longstanding IP rights, like patent and copyright laws. As this shift took 
place, a cramped understanding of [tort-based] privacy law—one focused 
more on private figures, seclusion, secrecy—overtook the broader notions 
of autonomy and dignity that had reigned over the first seven to eight 
decades of [tort-based] privacy law.125 
In sum, the right of publicity has come to protect the persona as a free-
standing intellectual property right apart from the human person. 
Conceptualizing the right of publicity as a property right in the persona allows 
a level of comfort with the right being assignable, descendible, survivable, 
taxable, and capable of division in the case of divorce.126 As J. Thomas 
McCarthy, author of the leading publicity treatise, has observed, “infringement 
of the right of publicity focuses upon injury to the pocketbook while an 
invasion of ‘appropriation privacy’ focuses upon injury to the psyche.”127 
Thus, the right of publicity is now typically considered transferable, and 
is structured so as to protect the economic interests of those who commodify 
their personas for a living. Rarely, if ever, do subjective emotional, dignitary, 
or reputational harms provide an apt basis for recovery.128 Indeed, the right of 
publicity as predicated on Judge Frank’s interpretation of New York law in 
Haelan has been accepted, and its doctrine has grown more sophisticated in the 
 
 122. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. 
 123. Id. at 575. 
 124. According to Rothman, given the Supreme Court’s binding precedential effect, “[i]t was Zacchini, 
not Haelan, that created what we understand today as the right of publicity.” Rothman, supra note 69, at 302. 
Perhaps so, though now with over 1000 citations, Judge Frank’s analysis in Haelan has proven extremely 
influential in terms of establishing publicity as a freestanding, transferable right in the persona.  
 125. See ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 86. 
 126. See infra Part IV. 
 127. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:60 (1987). In addition, 
according to the Nevada Supreme Court: 
The distinction between these two torts is the interest each seeks to protect. The appropriation tort 
seeks to protect an individual’s personal interest in privacy; the personal injury is measured in 
terms of the mental anguish that results from the appropriation of an ordinary individual’s identity. 
The right of publicity seeks to protect the property interest that a celebrity has in his or her name.  
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Berosini, 895 P.2d 1269, 1283 (Nev. 1995). 
 128. Barbas, supra note 72, at 1187. 
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nearly seventy years since it was decided.129 The next Part theorizes that Judge 
Frank—consciously or unconsciously—may have influenced this commercial 
and proprietary shift in right of publicity jurisprudence based on a 
psychoanalytic understanding of the personality as fractured into distinctly 
public and private aspects. 
II.  JUDGE JEROME FRANK’S PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE  
In attempting to better understand the conceptual division between 
privacy and publicity, this Part looks to the judicial philosophy of the right of 
publicity’s founder, Judge Jerome Frank. While Judge Frank gave few clues as 
to his motives in the Haelan decision, his controversial and aggressive form of 
legal realism was in fact largely built around a psychoanalytic model of the 
personality, stressing external and internal divisions. Judge Frank’s dualistic 
understanding of the personality could plausibly have motivated or influenced 
his drawing of a sharp divide in Haelan between the objective, commercial 
persona (publicity rights) and subjective harm to the inner person’s dignity and 
feelings (privacy rights). Perhaps that is why, as Halpern noted, it was “natural 
and obvious to [Judge Frank] . . . that celebrity personas should be treated as 
garden variety commodities.”130 And regardless of Judge Frank’s conscious 
intent, the psychoanalytic division of the self—into internal and external 
spheres—might provide a useful psychological metaphor for understanding the 
right of publicity’s protection of the public persona as distinct from the private 
psyche.131  
 
 129. Halpern, supra note 2. This doctrinal sophistication has yielded a hydra-like triad of sub-rights, which 
can usefully be described as the mirror image of the privacy torts. As Eric Johnson writes in his recent article, 
Disentangling the Right of Publicity, even all these years later, “courts have yet to clearly articulate what the 
right of publicity is.” Johnson, supra note 7, at 893. In an attempt to remedy this misunderstanding, Johnson 
commendably unearths three separate rights under the umbrella of a “right of publicity”: (1) an endorsement 
right, (2) a merchandising entitlement, and (3) the right against virtual impressment. Id. at 891. This triad 
mirrors public versions of the privacy torts: (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) public disclosure, (3) false light, 
and (4) appropriation of name or likeness. Id. at 896. In fact, Johnson’s article carves out right of publicity 
doctrine in much the same way as Prosser’s classic Privacy did for its namesake.  
 130. Madow, supra note 8, at 174 (emphasis added). Moreover, the rise of psychoanalysis as an important 
influence on legal doctrine and theory coincided with the development of the right of publicity as a strictly 
economic right. As Anne Dailey notes: 
In 1930, Jerome Frank published his seminal book, Law and the Modern Mind, which drew on 
psychoanalytic ideas to describe the distorting effects of infantile wishes and fantasies on the 
decision making of legal actors and judges. Over the following decades, the ascendance of 
psychoanalysis was reflected in legal scholarship on the insanity defense, child custody, and 
jurisprudence. Indeed, by the 1970s, psychoanalysts had even joined the Harvard and Yale law 
school faculties. 
Dailey, supra note 20, at 180 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 131. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kirshner, The Concept of the Self in Psychoanalytic Theory and its Philosophical 
Foundations, 39 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS’N. 157, 157 (1991) (noting that, at least historically, 
“[p]sychoanalysis has not utilized Hegel’s conception of the intersubjective origins of the self, in which the 
self emerges only in an encounter with another subject,” but instead reflects “a homuncular self internal to 
consciousness and the isolation of the subject from other selves”). 
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Even before his appointment to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 
1941,132 Judge Frank was a leading, though polarizing, figure in the American 
legal realist movement.133 He was known for his unique “psychological 
realism” exemplified in many scholarly works. These include his most 
influential work, the seminal 1930 book Law and the Modern Mind,134 as well 
as several other books and articles such as Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality 
in American Justice,135 Fate and Freedom: A Philosophy for Free 
Americans,136 Are Judges Human?,137 Judicial Fact-Finding and 
Psychology138 and Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?.139  
Judge Frank’s jurisprudence has come to be regarded as a “jurisprudence 
of therapy”140 or a “psychoanalysis of certain legal traditions”141 because of its 
reliance on the ideas of then cutting-edge thinkers like Sigmund Freud,142 Jean 
Piaget,143 and Carl Jung.144 In relying on their work and ideas, Frank created an 
“elaborate psychoanalytical apparatus” as an explanation of the “persistent 
longing of lawyers and non-lawyers for a patently unachievable legal 
 
 132. The son of a lawyer, Judge Frank was born in 1889. He received a Ph.D. from the University of 
Chicago in 1909 after studying under Charles Merriam who was developing a psychological approach to 
political science. He soon went on to enroll at the University of Chicago Law School and graduated in 1912 
with the highest grades in the school’s history. Upon graduation, he worked at a large corporate law firm in 
Chicago and then left to practice law at another corporate firm in New York City. Judge Frank underwent 
psychoanalysis while in New York and soon after, in 1930, wrote Law and the Modern Mind. Between 1933 
and 1941, he bounced back and forth between private practice and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal” 
administration. Judge Frank was then appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
despite experiencing anti-Semitism during the appointment process. Duxbury, supra note 11, at 176. 
 133. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement 
Analysis, 68 STAN. L. REV. 791, 800 (2016) (noting that much of Judge Frank’s legal philosophy “has since 
been soundly repudiated in American legal thinking”); Leiter, supra note 11, at 269 (“Even among Realists, of 
course, Frank’s view represented a particular sort of extreme—as Frank himself recognized.” (citing Jerome 
Frank, Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the Assumption that Judges Behave 
Like Human Beings, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 22–23, 30 n.31 (1931) [hereinafter Frank, Are Judges Human? Part 
One]). 
 134. See, e.g., Charles L. Barzun, Jerome Frank and the Modern Mind, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1127, 1128 
(2010) (noting that Law and the Modern Mind is still regarded as a “legal classic” and Frank’s “most famous 
contribution to legal theory”); Charles E. Clark, Jerome N. Frank, 66 YALE L.J. 817, 817 (1957) (noting that 
“Law and the Modern Mind fell like a bomb on the legal world”); Walter Wheeler Cook, Law and the Modern 
Mind: A Symposium, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 82, 82 (1931) (describing the book as “excit[ing][,]” “keen, cogent,” 
and “unique”). 
 135. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 14. 
 136. See FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM, supra note 15. 
 137. See Frank, Are Judges Human? Part One, supra note 133; Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part 
Two: As Through a Class Darkly, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 233 (1931). 
 138. See Jerome N. Frank, Judicial Fact-Finding and Psychology, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 183 (1953). 
 139. See Frank, supra note 13 (establishing what might be the first formal call for clinical legal education). 
 140. Thurman Arnold, Judge Jerome Frank, U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 635 (1957). 
 141. Duxbury, supra note 11, at 180. 
 142. See FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 1, at 359; FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM, supra 
note 15, at 64. 
 143. See FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 1, at 164. 
 144. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 14, at 366. 
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stability.”145 Judge Frank published the bulk of his work between 1930 and 
1953,146 the year he wrote the Haelan decision. 
Judge Frank underwent six months of intensive psychoanalysis in 1930, 
after which he published Law and the Modern Mind.147 The book, considered 
the foremost realist discussion of law and psychoanalysis,148 identifies his 
theory of a “basic legal myth,” unconsciously reinforced by lawyers, judges, 
and the public, that the law is objective and certain, and that applying legal 
rules to specific cases is a mechanical task performed by judges. For Judge 
Frank, rather, the “personality of the judge is the pivotal factor in law 
administration, then law may vary with the personality of the judge who 
happens to pass upon any given case.”149 As Judge Frank puts it: 
[Most people] retain a yearning for Someone or Something, qualitatively 
resembling father, to aid them in dissipating the fear of chance and 
change. . . . To the child the father is the Infallible Judge, the Maker of the 
definite rules of conduct. He knows precisely what is right and what is 
wrong and, as head of the family, sits in judgment and punishes misdeeds. 
The Law—a body of rules apparently devised for infallibly determining 
what is right and what is wrong and for deciding who should be punished 
for misdeeds—inevitably becomes a partial substitute for the Father-as-
Infallible-Judge. That is, the desire persists in grown men to recapture, 
through a rediscovery of a father, a childish, completely controllable 
universe, and that desire seeks satisfaction in a partial, unconscious, 
anthropomorphizing of Law, in ascribing to the Law some of the 
characteristics of the child’s Father-Judge. That childish longing is an 
important element in the explanation of the absurdly unrealistic notion that 
law is, or can be made, entirely certain and definitely predictable.150 
While Judge Frank maintained and refined his psychoanalytic approach to 
understanding the law throughout his career, as a lawyer, scholar, and later a 
judge,151 he first became interested in the works of Freud while a student at the 
 
 145. Edward F. Barrett, Confessions and Avoidance—Reflections on Rereading Judge Frank’s Law and 
the Modern Mind, 24 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 449 (1949). 
 146. See Balganesh, supra note 133, at 814. 
 147. Duxbury, supra note 11, at 176. 
 148. Peter Goodrich, Habermas and the Postal Rule, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1457, 1465 n.30 (1996); see 
also Dailey, supra note 20, at 180. 
 149.  FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 1, at 119-20. 
 150. Id. at 18. 
 151. Duxbury, supra note 11, at 177. For examples of this continual reliance on psychoanalytic thinking in 
Judge Frank’s later works in the 1950s, see FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM supra note 15, at 65 (“Our 
justification lies in the fact that psychoanalytic research has taught us that all these tendencies [described by 
Freud and Marx] are an expression of the same instinctive activities; in relations between the sexes these 
instincts force their way toward sexual union, but, in other circumstances, they are diverted from this aim or 
prevented from reaching it, though always preserving enough of their original nature to keep their identity 
recognizable.”); see also FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 14, at 395–96 (“Excessive classicism, with its 
excessive worship of abstractions, has its psychological roots in a morbid fear of particulars, of uniques. To 
‘the man with the abstracting attitude,’ says Jung, ‘the world is filled with powerfully operating and therefore 
dangerous objects; these inspire him with fear, and with a consciousness of his own impotence: he withdraws 
himself from a too close contact with the world, thus to create those . . . formulae with which he hopes to gain 
the upper hand.’ Craving ‘fixed bounds,’ seeking a negation . . . of irreconcilable diversities,’ by abstractions 
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University of Chicago before undergoing psychoanalysis himself.152 As Neil 
Duxbury writes in Jerome Frank and the Legacy of Legal Realism:  
Frank clearly found in psychoanalysis his panacea: just as psychoanalysis 
had purged him of his inner conflicts so too, with comparable results, he 
believed it might be applied to the judicial system. Without pausing to 
consider whether or not psychoanalysis—concerned at core with human 
individuals—might plausibly be re-cast as an institutional theory, Frank 
appeared basically to resolve that it could provide an all-encompassing 
framework for judicial critique and reform.153 
Indeed, for Judge Frank, “Freud’s conception of the psyche as a dynamic 
interplay between id, ego, and superego appeared to support the American 
Legal Realist interpretation of judging as a highly subjective and indeterminate 
activity.”154 As Joseph Goldstein writes regarding psychoanalysis as an 
institutional theory of law:  
Though law is stereotypically perceived as being concerned with an 
external image of man, and psychoanalysis with his internal image, each 
discipline is in fact concerned with both faces of man. While legal training, 
practice, and research concentrate primarily on man’s external world, the 
substance and process of law depend heavily on assumptions about man’s 
internal world.155 
Under this dualistic viewpoint, Judge Frank thought “[t]he key to reform 
was thus not observation of judicial behavior, but rather for judges themselves 
to engage in individual introspection as to their own thoughts, feelings, beliefs, 
purposes, goals, and assumptions.”156 Under the umbrella of the “basic legal 
myth,” as Shyamkrishna Balganesh has explained, Judge Frank sought to bring 
into focus three subjective ideas about the law: (1) indeterminacy, (2) hunches, 
and (3) fact skepticism—in contrast to the formalist view of the law as an 
objective science.157 This “conventional image of the law,” was, for Judge 
Frank, “a mask, a false-face, made to suit unconscious childish desires,”158 that 
hides the reality that the law is never capable of providing exact and 
discernible answers.159 
 
he ‘conjures impressions into a law-abiding form,’ and thereby ‘depotentiates’ particulars, puts an end to their 
‘tyrannical hold,’ there ‘threatening quality.’ Thus he strives to rob life of what are to him its dangerous 
spontaneities. His attempted use of abstractions wholly to ‘confine the changing and irregular within law 
abiding limits’ is ‘at bottom a magical procedure.” (citing Carl Jung, The Type Problems in Aesthetics, in 6 
THE COLLECTED WORKS: PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES, 289, 296 (Gerhard Adler & R. F.C. Hull, eds. and trans., 
1971))). 
 152. Duxbury, supra note 11, at 176. 
 153. Id. at 181. 
 154. Zariski, supra note 19, at 300; see also Dailey, supra note 20, at 180.  
 155. Joseph Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 77 YALE L.J. 1053, 1054 (1968). 
 156. Barzun, supra note 134, at 1162 (emphasis added). 
 157. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 133, at 815–821. 
 158. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 1, at 175. 
 159. See e.g., BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND 
NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 10–11 (2007). Leiter also referred to Judge Frank’s belief system as 
“Global Rational Indeterminacy.” Id. at 11. For additional information on this theory, see Balganesh, supra 
note 133, at 816. 
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First, Judge Frank believed that legal and judicial thinking is inherently 
imprecise and indeterminate. “The trouble with legal thinking,” said Judge 
Frank, “is not the mental inadequacies of the lawyers. It is the very nature of 
law, its role as a father substitute, that stirs up unconscious attitudes, concealed 
desires, illusory ideals, which gets in the way of realistic observation of the 
workings and significance of law.”160 Lawyers and judges “like the laymen, 
fail to recognize fully the essentially plastic and mutable character of law” and 
erroneously believe that “rules either are or can be made essentially 
immutable.”161 In effect, lawyers are not being “consciously deceptive” in 
perpetuating the myth; the myth—that the law is a science—is unconscious. 
Judge Frank even writes regarding what he refers to as the “public-private 
dichotomy:” 
It is the child’s naïve egocentricity, his unconsciousness of self, which 
leads him to regard his own perspective as immediately objective and 
absolute; to assimilate external processes to schemas arising from his own 
internal experiences, attributing to the outer world characteristics which 
properly belong to his mind . . . and, generally speaking, to fail to 
differentiate between internal and external, psychical and physical, mind 
and body, subjective and objective.162 
The consequence of this legal myth is that “demand for exactness and 
predictability in law is incapable of satisfaction because a greater degree of 
legal finality is sought than is procurable, desirable or necessary.”163 To this 
end, Judge Frank sought to show that “judging” does not involve the 
mechanical application of legal rules to facts, but also involves actual 
lawmaking. Legal rules and principles, for Judge Frank, are merely 
“psychological pulleys, psychical levers, mental bridges or ladders, means of 
orientation, [or] modes of reflection” rather than a hard constraint on legal and 
judicial thinking.164  
Second, given that legal rules are not the primary determinates of judicial 
reasoning, but rather these “psychological pulleys,” Judge Frank’s account of 
how judges decide individual cases was based on subjective hunches.165 For 
Judge Frank, the hunch represents the judge’s subjective reactions to the facts 
and circumstances—“that intuitive flash of understanding which makes the 
jump-spark connection between question and decision, and at the point where 
the path is darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its light along the way.”166 The 
 
 160. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 1, at 91. 
 161. Id. at 9. 
 162. Id. at 77 (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. at 11. 
 164. Id. at 167. 
 165. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 
14 CORNELL. L. REV. 274, 279 (1929). 
 166. Id. at 278. 
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facts generate the hunch, Judge Frank believed, which is then filtered through 
the judge’s impulses and unconscious biases.167 
Third, distinct from other legal realists, Judge Frank believed in “fact 
skepticism,” that is, that uncertainty in legal decision-making resulted not just 
from uncertainty in the law (rule skepticism), but from biased interpretations of 
the facts of a case as well. In several of his later works, Judge Frank claimed 
that every federal judge should undergo compulsory psychoanalysis so as to 
clear their minds of subjective biases, unconscious prejudices, and peculiar 
thought processes.168 Judges, as human beings, cannot “prevent their personal 
preferences from governing their decisions” unless “each judge, with the 
assistance of a psychiatrist, engage[s] in a voyage of self-exploration and so 
become conscious of those sub-threshold biases.”169  
In sum, Judge Frank believed that the law, as an objective science, was a 
mask that hid its inner subjectivity. As he described the legal persona: 
The conventional image of the law is, of course, a mask, a false-face, made 
to suit unconscious childish desires. But that false-face terrifies even the 
persons who have made it. The law, as they picture it, will not allow the 
judges to indulge their feelings, their sympathies, for the persons appearing 
as suitors in the courtroom; the law, they believe, when properly 
administered, creates impersonal and artificial rules, which command 
respect because they guard against any human “weakness” in the 
judge . . . . The judge, wearing a false-face, which makes him seem like the 
child’s stern father, gravely recites the impersonal and artificial rules 
which command respect.170  
Interestingly, Judge Frank’s description of the legal personality is very 
similar to what Carl Jung writes regarding the psychoanalytic persona, which 
will be explored in the next Part:  
[W]hoever looks into the mirror of the water will see first of all his own 
face. Whoever goes to himself risks a confrontation with himself. The 
mirror does not flatter, it faithfully shows whatever looks into it; namely, 
the face we never show to the world because we cover it with the persona, 
 
 167. Id. at 116 (“The judge, in arriving at his hunch, does not nicely separate his belief as to the ‘facts’ 
from his conclusion as to the ‘law’; his general hunch is more integral and composite, and affects his report—
both to himself and the public—concerning the facts. . . . The judge’s decision is determined by a hunch 
arrived at long after the event on the basis of his reaction to fallible testimony.”). 
 168. See FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 226–27; Jerome N. Frank, Some Reflections on 
Judge Learned Hand, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 678 (1957) [hereinafter Frank, Some Reflections]; Jerome 
Frank, Say It with Music, 61 HARV. L. REV. 921, 955 (1948) [hereinafter Frank, Say It with Music]; see also 
Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1066 (2006) 
(“Jerome Frank thought judges should undergo psychoanalysis, as he had done; this is a ridiculous 
suggestion.”); Fred Rodell, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice, by Jerome Frank, 25 IND. 
L.J. 114, 119 (1949) (book review) (suggesting “that the compulsory psychoanalysis of every prospective 
judge, which Judge Frank does propose, is no more utopian or radical”); Brendan F. Brown, Jerome Frank and 
the Natural Law, 5 CATH. LAW. 133, 141 (1959). 
 169. Frank, Some Reflections, supra note 168, at 678. 
 170. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 1, at 175 (emphasis added).  
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the mask of the actor. But the mirror lies behind the mask and shows the 
true face.171 
Might Judge Frank’s belief in an actor’s mask (a false face or objective 
image) as distinct from the “true” self (the subjective, inner, private life of the 
individual) have influenced his decision to theorize a personality right over that 
very mask? 
III.  THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MODEL OF THE DIVIDED SELF  
This Part examines the psychoanalytic concept of the self. It especially 
focuses on the Jungian “persona,” the psychological corollary to the aspect of 
the personality, which the right of publicity protects. In the spirit of Judge 
Frank’s psychoanalytic approach to the law, support for a hard separation 
between privacy and publicity can be found in this psychoanalytic view of the 
fragmented self.172 This traditional psychoanalytic view of the self retained a 
“Cartesian dualism” between mind and body, hence its emphasis on inner and 
outer dimensions of the personality.173  
A. FREUD’S EGO AND ID 
At least in a mainstream Western sense, Sigmund Freud introduced the 
theory of a fragmented or layered personality—one divided into subparts: the 
id, the ego, and the super-ego.174 In Freud’s 1919 work, The Interpretation of 
Dreams, he sought to demonstrate that a person’s outer behavior and 
appearance were not necessarily the same as their inner needs and longings.175 
As an example, Freud claims that dreaming cannot be explained if we 
conceptualize ourselves as a unity.176 In other words, Freud asks “who is the 
dreamer?,” as distinct from the waking person, to illustrate that the self is not a 
unity, but rather an “amalgamation of two separate people.”177  
As Freud claimed in The Pleasure Principle, the experience of psychic 
pain is also evidence of a divided self.178 In this early formulation of Freud’s 
 
 171. C. G. Jung, Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, in 9 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF C. G. JUNG, 
PART I: ARCHETYPES AND THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 3, 20 (Gerhard Adler & R. F.C. Hull, eds. and 
trans., 2d ed. 1969) (second, third, fourth, and fifth emphasis added). 
 172. See, e.g., Alex Watson, Who Am I? The Self/Subject According to Psychoanalytic Theory, 4 SAGE 
OPEN, no. 3, 2014, at 1, 2, http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12328212. 
 173. Robert D. Stolorow, Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis as Phenomenological Contextualism, in WORLD, 
AFFECTIVITY, TRAUMA: HEIDEGGER AND POST-CARTESIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS 19, 20 (2011) (“Freud’s 
psychoanalysis expanded the Cartesian mind, Descartes’s ‘thinking thing,’ to include a vast unconscious 
realm. . . .[Yet] . . . the Freudian mind remained a Cartesian mind, a self-enclosed worldless subject or mental 
apparatus containing and working over mental contents and radically separated from its surround.”). 
 174. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 18 (1923) [hereinafter FREUD, THE EGO]. 
 175. See SEARS A. ELDREDGE, MASK IMPROVISATION FOR ACTOR TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE: THE 
COMPELLING IMAGE 13 (1996). 
 176. SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 5 (A.A. Brill trans., MacMillan Company 2d ed. 
1919) (emphasis added). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
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theory, he outlines a conflict between a primitive and instinctual layer of the 
psyche in contrast to the ego, which rests uneasily atop the psychic appetite, 
and effects a kind of compromise between base instinct and social necessity. 
To the extent that the conscious self (the ego) can provide gratification to its 
unconscious component (instinct), the self, as a whole, experiences 
gratification. Yet, to the extent that the ego fails to do so, the conscious self 
experiences pain.179  
The nature of Freud’s two parts of the self (which he later modified in his 
1923 work, The Ego and the Id), is less important than the dualism he 
articulated, which provides the beginnings of a psychoanalytic rhetoric that 
includes a dichotomy between an extroverted ego and an introverted id.180 For 
Freud, the personality that is outwardly expressed is a compromise between 
these competing impulses.  
According to Freud’s mature theory, the ego is the public-facing portion 
of the self that interfaces with the outside world and makes the calculations and 
compromises necessary for socialization,181 which tends to align with the 
concerns implicated by the right of publicity. As Freud puts it, the ego is “that 
part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external 
world.”182 The ego, which is most in touch with external reality, stands in 
sharp contrast with the unconscious and introverted id—the libido or sex 
impulse,183 which aligns with the kinds of shame that Warren and Brandeis 
were seeking to keep hidden in The Right to Privacy. The super-ego is not so 
much a third part of the self as it is the apex of the ego, a standard to which the 
ego strives based on ideals provided externally.184  
In sum, for Freud, the self is appropriately represented as a plurality of id, 
ego and superego, with the id comprising the internal psychic structure as 
compared to the externally motivated ego and superego.185 Building off of 
Freud’s theory of the person, continued psychological research, such as by 
Jung, expanded on his partition of the person into an “outer persona” as 
contrasted with an “inner figure.”186 
 
 179. Though Freud uses the language of consciousness to distinguish parts of the self, he cautions that his 
more particular distinction is functional; or in other words, between coherence and repression: “We escape 
ambiguity if we contrast not the conscious and the unconscious, but the coherent ego and the repressed. Much 
in the ego is certainly unconscious itself, just what may be called the kernel of the ego; only a part of it comes 
under the category of preconscious.” SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE 19 (1922) 
[hereinafter FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE]. 
 180. See, e.g., 4 STEVEN COOPER, ID., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 221–22 (Alan E. Kazdin ed., 
2000) (“In Freudian theory, the id is the division of the psyche that is totally unconscious and serves as the 
source of instinctual impulses and demands for immediate satisfaction of primitive needs. The ego is that 
which is conscious in a person, most immediately controls thought and behavior, and is most in touch with 
external reality.”). 
 181. FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE, supra note 179, at 13. 
 182. FREUD, THE EGO, supra note 174, at 25. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 18. 
 185. See Watson, supra note 172, at 4. 
 186. ROBERT H. HOPCKE, PERSONA: WHERE SACRED MEETS PROFANE 35 (1958). 
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B. JUNG’S PERSONA AND SHADOW 
Freud’s contemporary, Carl Jung, provides the closest descriptive 
corollary to the divide between privacy and publicity, labeling the “persona” as 
the outward and external face of the psyche, or “the mask of the actor.”187 As 
described in Beneath the Mask, a text on theories of personality, “[t]he 
metaphor of the actor and his mask was used by Carl Jung . . . to indicate the 
public self of the individual, the image he presents to others, as contrasted with 
his feelings, cognition, and interpretations of reality anchored in his private 
self.”188  
Jung contrasted the “arbitrary segment of the collective psyche,”189—the 
persona, with the inner attitude of the person, which he refers to as the 
“shadow”—that part of the self which an individual represses or keeps 
hidden.190 The persona is one of the most widely adopted aspects of Jungian 
psychology, and, like Jung’s concepts of introversion and extraversion as 
personality types, has attained common and colloquial usage.191  
In his seminal work, Psychological Types, Jung describes the persona as 
the outer, extraverted workings of a person, or “how one appears to oneself 
and the world, but not what one is.”192 Distinct from the “true self,” the 
psychological persona designates only the aspect of the personality that one 
presents to the world in public to gain social approval or economic advantage: 
“a kind of mask, designed on one hand to make a definite impression upon 
others, and on the other to conceal the true nature of the individual.”193 Similar 
to Judge Frank’s depiction of the legal persona, Jung notes that  
Every calling or profession, for example, has its own characteristic persona. 
It is easy to study these things nowadays, when the photographs of public 
personalities so frequently appear in the press. A certain kind of behaviour 
is forced on them by the world, and professional people endeavor to come 
up with these expectations.194  
The persona, as an ideal, external image, is “exclusively concerned with 
the relation to objects,” or, in other words, people and things in the material 
world.195 Jung typically spoke disparagingly of the persona as “nothing real; it 
is a compromise between the individual and society as to what a man should 
 
 187. Jung, supra note 171, at 20.  
 188. MONTE, supra note 27, at 20. 
 189. Jung, supra note 26, at 281. 
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WE HIDE 9–10 (2011). 
 191. See, e.g., ERIC BERNE, SEX IN HUMAN LOVING 98 (1973). 
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 193. Jung, supra note 26, at 192; see also BERNE, supra note 26, at 79; cf. WINNICOTT, supra note 26, at 
148. 
 194. C. G. Jung, Concerning Rebirth, in 9 THE COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 171, at 112, 122–23; see 
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 195. HOPCKE, supra note 186, at 11. 
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appear to be.”196 Jung also explained the persona’s deceptive nature as the 
surface-level part of the whole person: 
The term persona is really a very appropriate expression for this, for 
originally it meant the mask once worn by actors to indicate the role they 
played. . . . It is, as its name implies, only a mask of the collective psyche, a 
mask that feigns individuality, making others and oneself believe that one is 
individual, whereas one is simply acting a role through which the collective 
psyche speaks.197  
According to Jung, analysis of the persona involves “strip[ping] off the 
mask, and discover[ing] that what seemed to be individual is at bottom 
collective; in other words, that the persona was only a mask of the collective 
psyche.”198 An individual “takes a name, earns a title, exercises a function, he 
is this or that,” but as compared to “the essential individuality of the person 
concerned,” these objective aspects are “only a secondary reality, a 
compromise formation.”199 The persona is thus “a semblance, a two-
dimensional reality” of an individual’s true nature,200 as distinct from the inner 
“true self.”201 Jungian analyst Murray Stein writes: 
Persona is a type of mask. It hides parts of the self that you do not want 
to be seen by others, and it also express[es] who you feel you are at the 
present time. Personas are created by choosing a particular life style, by 
clothes, by hairstyle and adornments like jewelry or tattoos or piercings, by 
cosmetic make up and scent, and by association with friends, a chosen 
profession or fan club or political party. The persona also includes behavior 
and plays itself out in roles that say who you are for and with others. But it 
does not say who you are when you are alone. 202 
And Jung also spoke of the etymology of the term persona, from per 
sonare, meaning “to sound through, derived from the way in which ancient 
masks were fitted with tubes, not unlike megaphones, which the actors behind 
the mask used to project their voices toward the audience.”203 In effect, “[o]ne 
could say, with a little exaggeration, that the persona is that which in reality 
one is not, but which oneself as well as others think one is.”204 As Jung puts it: 
It would be wrong to leave the matter as it stands without at the same time 
recognizing that there is, after all, something individual in the peculiar 
choice and delineation of the persona, and that despite the exclusive 
identity of the ego-consciousness with the persona the unconscious self, 
 
 196. C. G. Jung, The Persona as a Segment of the Collective Psyche, in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS, supra 
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persona as “the social archetype” or the “conformity archetype”). 
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one’s real individuality, is always present and makes itself felt indirectly if 
not directly. Although the ego-consciousness is at first identical with the 
persona—that compromise role in which we parade before the 
community—yet the unconscious self can never be repressed to the point of 
extinction.205 
In contrast to the persona, Jung called the inner and unconscious aspect of 
the personality the “shadow,” or “what was hidden under the mask of 
conventional adaptation.”206 The shadow in the Jungian model encompasses 
the unknown dark side, which are the least desirable aspects, of one’s 
personality.207 Similar to Freud’s id, the shadow is irrational and instinctive, 
comprising the unconscious part of the psyche.208  
In opposition to the social, collective, and public persona, the shadow is 
“fed by the neglected and repressed collective values,”209 and “personifies 
everything that the subject refuses to acknowledge about himself.”210 This may 
include “such things as egotism, mental laziness, and sloppiness; unreal 
fantasies, schemes and plots; carelessness and cowardice; inordinate love of 
money and possessions.”211 The shadow aspect of the personality is dark 
“because it predominantly consists of the primitive, negative, socially or 
religiously depreciated human emotions and impulses such as hunger for 
power, selfishness, greed, envy, anger or rage.”212 Like the Freudian id, the 
Jungian shadow can thus be seen to align with the personal shame that Warren 
and Brandeis wanted to protect in The Right to Privacy,213 in contrast to the 
persona’s public and communicatory role, as articulated in Haelan.214  
As Jung writes with respect to the contrast between privacy and publicity: 
The demands of propriety and good manners are an added inducement to 
assume a becoming mask. What goes on behind the mask is then called 
“private life.” This painfully familiar division of consciousness into two 
figures, often preposterously different, is an incisive psychological 
operation that is bound to have repercussions on the unconscious.215 
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In sum, Jung treats the outer “persona” as merely a “shallow, brittle, 
conformist kind of personality,”216 perhaps undeserving of dignitary, 
emotional, and non-commercial considerations. And, in its collective rather 
than individual aspect, it is easily severable from the identity-holder. Indeed, to 
the extent that, in adopting a psychoanalytic view of the self, Judge Frank 
thought of the outer personality as a sort of false self or actor’s mask, it made 
perfect sense for him to treat it like a garden variety commodity—a 
transferable form of intellectual property. 
IV.  PUBLICITY AND THE FALSE SELF  
This Part examines the consequences of a right protecting the mask of the 
actor, in the metaphorical sense, apart from the actor herself. Under the 
psychoanalytic view, we see a theoretical split between the false façade, or 
persona, and the inner self, or shadow. This is consistent with the right of 
privacy’s protection of seclusion, secrecy, and hurt feelings, in contrast to 
Judge Frank’s articulation of the right of publicity as concerning public figures 
and their commercial interests. Judge Frank did not specifically mention 
psychoanalytic influences in Haelan. However, it would make sense that, in 
ascribing to a psychoanalytic viewpoint, it was “natural and obvious”217 for 
Judge Frank to bifurcate personality rights into inner private and outer public 
dimensions, as his psychoanalytic influencers around that time period were apt 
to do.218 This theoretical account is consistent with the right of publicity as the 
“reverse side of the coin of privacy.”219 
A. THE ACTOR’S MASK METAPHOR 
Privacy law scholars frequently use visual metaphors to describe privacy-
related problems.220 Examples of such metaphors include the anthropomorphic 
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figure of Big Brother from George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four,221 or 
Jeremy Bentham’s image of the Panopticon prison,222 to describe privacy 
problems. Along these lines, Jung’s persona as actor’s mask perhaps serves as 
 
Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway 
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an accurate metaphor for what the right of publicity currently aims to 
protect.223  
The actor’s mask is descriptive of the right of publicity’s transformation 
from a personal right under the rubric of privacy, rooted in the individual, to a 
property-like right external to the person, an object that can be bought and sold 
like a commodity.224 The actor’s mask conception of publicity is consistent 
with its transferability and strictly commercial nature, and thus its status as an 
intellectual property right.225 An actor can take off their mask and do with it 
what they wish, hence the right of publicity’s alienability. And when the actor 
dies, her mask survives her, hence its descendibility under certain state laws.226 
The actor likely will not have an emotional attachment to that mask as an 
object distinct from its subject, hence the right of publicity’s economic focus.  
Despite its descriptive accuracy, though, the actor’s mask metaphor is 
problematic from a normative perspective. For what reason should we justify 
protecting only the public aspect, or external image, of an individual? As Alice 
Haemmerli writes, “as nothing more than a claim to an objectified commodity, 
[the right of publicity] cannot be theoretically reconciled with non-economic 
personal interests such as those protected by privacy.”227 Indeed, the common 
justifications for a property right in an outer self are not wholly persuasive.228 
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Because of the strictly commercial nature of the right, the primary 
justifications for it focus on the intellectual property-oriented justifications of 
Lockean labor theory, economic incentives, unjust enrichment, and consumer 
protection, to the relative exclusion of personhood, dignity, and autonomy. The 
following Subpart will now briefly touch on these justifications and their 
criticisms.229  
B. OBJECTIVE PUBLICITY JUSTIFICATIONS 
A popular justification for the right of publicity is built on John Locke’s 
labor theory of property. That is, “every person is entitled to the fruit of his 
labors unless there are important countervailing public policy 
considerations.”230 According to Locke, a system of private property was 
needed to determine how to allocate rivalrous objects in the case of conflicting 
claims.231 Labor, as a morally significant act, was Locke’s solution. The person 
who labored for the property is the one who should prevail in the case of 
opposing claims. And labor makes exclusive ownership acceptable.232 By this 
logic, the celebrity status that is associated with the right of publicity is one 
that comes from hard work and determination.233  
But this justification is suspect in the case of the right of publicity. As 
Mark McKenna argues, identity, as an intangible, is nonrivalrous and thus, not 
scarce. Because it need not be appropriated exclusively, Lockean property 
theory’s applicability to a property right over the persona is suspect.234 It might 
also be that adherence to Locke is misplaced because of its reliance on a sort of 
libertarian free will that does not exist.235 Not all personalities “work hard” for 
their fame. Many were in the right place at the right time. For others, talent 
comes very naturally.236  
Further, it is unclear if the issue of “fame” is what is valuable and being 
exploited by advertisers. Advertisers choose personas to place in 
advertisements because of the meaning that they hold in our collective society. 
If such meaning is developed by the public in its collective aspect, it seems like 
a stretch for the celebrity to claim that her labor is entirely responsible for its 
value; fame and meaning are conferred onto celebrities by the public and not 
built up by a celebrity in the same way that a carpenter builds a chair from 
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wood.237 Therefore, because celebrities do not exclusively construct their 
personas, it is not altogether convincing that labor should provide a principle 
justification for a personality right. 
Unjust enrichment provides another possible justification for protecting 
the public persona. Because public personalities do at least something to bring 
about their fame, allowing others to exploit it might be seen to unjustly enrich 
them at the expense of the persona-holder.238 Our society dislikes free riding—
allowing others to reap where they have not sown.239 No matter how or who 
actually created the value, a new valuable asset has been created and allowing 
others to profit from it might simply be unfair. The right of publicity might 
correct this unfairness. That is, it gives public figures the legal means to 
control their marketable fame and keep others from appropriating that fame for 
their own benefit.240 One issue with the unjust enrichment justification, though, 
is that it assumes that personas are original; rather, public personalities 
typically build their images and personalities by appropriating things from 
society and culture.241 Madonna, for example, built her persona on an “ironic 
reworking of the Hollywood myth of ‘the blonde.’”242 Additionally, a focus on 
unjust enrichment tends to concentrate, perhaps erroneously, on the profits of 
the infringer, rather than the harm to the publicity-holder, in evaluating 
harm.243  
Much like in copyright law, the right of publicity is sometimes 
rationalized, including by the Supreme Court, as promoting an economic 
incentives structure.244 Giving people control over their masks “induces people 
to expend the time, effort, and resources necessary to develop talents and 
produce works that ultimately benefit society as a whole.”245 Control of 
persona encourages activities that are socially valuable by making up for the 
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downsides of being in the spotlight, which is important in a world where fame 
is fickle. If this protection was not available, the idea goes, less people would 
be willing to venture out onto the stage of publication.  
However, the financial rewards for achieving fame are often great without 
the needed control incentive.246 Moreover, incentives for achieving success in 
a given (public) field and incentives to develop a public persona, while 
sometimes overlapping, are typically distinct.247 And if the right of publicity 
incentivizes anything, it is not clear that it is incentivizing anything productive, 
perhaps leading to overinvestment in celebrity and producing more people who 
are “famous for being famous” (like the Kardashians, for instance).248 
Moreover, a right seeking to incentivize investment in celebrity personas will 
tend to afford protection only to those personas which are commercially 
valuable, leaving others whose images have entered the public arena without 
recourse.249  
A consumer protection justification is also sometimes invoked, analogous 
to trademark law.250 That is, the right of publicity might be needed to protect 
consumers from being confused or misled about product endorsements.251 The 
right of publicity, under this justification, seeks to protect consumers from 
wrongly thinking that a celebrity endorsed or sponsored a product when he or 
she has not. It is unclear, though, that consumers are typically damaged by 
confusion as to the source of one’s identity. Regardless, the right of publicity 
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gives the celebrity a cause of action for claims even in cases where it is clear 
that consumers would not believe the advertisements are endorsements.  
One could also argue that such a consumer confusion-oriented 
justification makes the right of publicity redundant to the Lanham Act—the 
federal trademark statute.252 That is, if the true concern of the right of publicity 
is consumer protection, then perhaps amendments should be made to expand 
the Lanham Act, rather than having the right of publicity constitute a separate 
cause of action.253 Though as Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley have 
convincingly pointed out, limiting applicability of the right of publicity to 
cases involving confusion of some kind or another might be a helpful 
mechanism in cabining the right, which is widely seen as lacking conceptual 
boundaries, to certain situations.254 
Thus, the conceptualization of the right of publicity as protecting the 
external self leaves us with justifications imported from other intellectual 
property regimes, which, while facially promising, are ultimately 
unconvincing. Further, these justifications support the right of publicity as a 
freely transferable intellectual property right,255 which, as Jennifer Rothman 
has explored, has several negative practical consequences. 
First, aspiring actors, musicians, and models, who, unlike celebrities, 
have little leverage in contract negotiation, may lose control of their names, 
images, or personas by long-term license or assignment.256 For example, reality 
television contestants must sometimes sign over their rights to their personas to 
producers or production companies as a prerequisite to appearing on the show. 
Consider the predatory nature of the following redacted representation of 
language in a Publishing Agreement between a television film studio and 
prospective reality television contestant (who is not otherwise famous): 
Participant hereby grants to Producer . . . the perpetual, exclusive right, but 
not the obligation to use and authorize others to use Participant’s name(s), 
voice, image, photograph, personal characteristics, persona, life-story, 
signature, actual or simulated likeness, expressions, performance, attributes, 
personal experiences and biographical information (collectively, “Name 
and Likeness”) in and in connection with the production, distribution, 
advertising, publicity, promotion, merchandising, exhibition and other 
exploitation of all versions and formats of the Program (including its title) 
and the businesses, services, programs and/or products of . . . Producer and 
its licenses, sub-licensees and assigns (including all advertising, publicity 
and promotion and materials associated therewith) and in or in connection 
with any episode of the Program in which Participant does not appear, 
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including without limitation in billing, cast credits, advertising, promoting 
or publicizing any such episode, in any manner, in any and all media and by 
any means now known or hereafter devised . . . . Producer . . . may include 
photographs or other images or depictions of the likeness of Participant in 
or in relation to any exploitation of the Program and all documentaries, 
“behind-the-scenes,” “the making of” featurettes, promotional films and 
videos of the Program in any manner and by any means throughout the 
universe.257 
Second, social media companies, like Facebook and Twitter, have 
claimed the ability to use the names and images of their users for advertising 
and endorsement purposes.258 Consider the following abridged representation 
from Facebook’s terms of service agreement: 
Permission to use your name, profile picture, and information about your 
actions with ads and sponsored content: You give us permission to use your 
name and profile picture and information about actions you have taken on 
Facebook next to or in connection with ads, offers, and other sponsored 
content that we display across our Products, without any compensation to 
you.259  
This is often against the will of social media users.260 And conceivably, 
these social media companies could change their terms of service or privacy 
policies to allow broader rights in their users’ personas, using their names, 
images, or likeness for other purposes as well.261  
Third, parents have transferred rights in the identities of their underage 
children, who have struggled to get them back upon reaching the age of legal 
maturity.262 Fourth, those with lucrative public personas, creditors, employers, 
or ex-spouses might be able to take ownership of their identities during cases 
of monetary or familial disputes.263 Finally, student athletes have been made to 
sign broad publicity releases to the NCAA as a condition for playing sports at 
the collegiate level, giving the NCAA the right to license (and potentially even 
assign) players’ personas indefinitely.264 In these ways, the alienable right of 
publicity can be thought of as stripping away the identity of individuals.265  
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C. SUBJECTIVE PUBLICITY JUSTIFICATIONS 
In attempting to bring the focus from the actor’s mask back to the actor, 
several commentators have proposed dignity and autonomy-based 
justifications for the right of publicity. Rothman believes that “the best 
justifications, perhaps the only legitimate ones, for the right of publicity are not 
those rooted in analogies to IP but those focused on protecting a person’s 
identity, particularly the person’s name or likeness, when the uses are likely to 
cause dignitary, emotional, or economic harms.”266 Along these lines, Alice 
Haemmerli and Mark McKenna have offered two significant examples of 
theories that involve the right of publicity as protecting an autonomous self. 
Haemmerli proposes a Kantian view of the right of publicity. In contrast 
to the Lockean conception, which focuses on the right of publicity as a 
property right external to the individual, Haemmerli’s focus is on the internal 
autonomous self. For Haemmerli, a normative underpinning based on 
Immanuel Kant’s idealist philosophy shifts the focus of the right of publicity 
from a strictly economic right to one also focused on morality and personhood. 
One that considers “the individual as an autonomous being preceding the 
creation of property.”267  
Kant viewed the individual as an autonomous and moral being. Freedom, 
for Kant, is an innate right: the “sole and original right that belongs to every 
human being by virtue of his humanity,” and, in invoking a notion of control 
and self-determination, “the attribute of a human being’s being his own 
master.”268 This central concept of autonomy in Kantian philosophy, 
Haemmerli believed, lent itself to a philosophical justification for the right of 
publicity: “Autonomy implies the individual’s right to control the use of her 
own person, since interference with one’s person is a direct infringement of the 
innate right of freedom (which takes concrete form in social life as liberty or 
freedom from compulsion by others).”269  
Haemmerli then attempts to link this concept of personal autonomy with 
Kant’s theory of property, which, together, might be seen to establish a link in 
objectified identity. Under the Kantian framework, property stems from human 
freedom: “it is an a priori assumption of practical reason that any and every 
object of my will be viewed and treated as something that has the objective 
possibility of being yours or mine.”270 Thus, in the Kantian system, property is 
inseparable from one’s personhood because property grows from freedom and 
freedom is essential to personhood.271 If one’s own external image is treated as 
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an object capable of “being yours or mine,” then perhaps it is best claimed by 
the person who serves as its natural source.272 As Haemmerli puts it: 
[A]n innate right to one’s persona, and an accompanying property right in 
the uses and control of the objectification of that persona, can be grounded 
in idealist philosophy (keeping in mind that image-as-object may also be 
qualified as having a [sic] subjective, personal, inward aspect and that it is 
not a “thing” like any other). Like intellectual property, image can be 
viewed as unique, a product of the peculiar mix of mental, psychological, 
and physical attributes that make the progenitor the individual she 
is. . . . Even more broadly, this philosophical orientation permits us to 
reconceive the right of publicity as a freedom-based property right with 
both moral and economic characteristics, rather than being forced to make a 
dichotomous choice between a privacy right concerned with moral injury 
on the one hand, or a purely pecuniary publicity right on the other.273 
Similarly, Mark McKenna has proposed an alternative justification for the 
right of publicity based on individual autonomous self-definition, which like 
Haemmerli’s theory, would support an emphasis on the emotional harms 
caused by the commercial use of one’s identity.274 McKenna argues that the 
appropriation of identity implicates an individual’s ability to “autonomously 
define” themselves, thus inflicting harm.275 According to McKenna, while the 
“unauthorized commercial use of a private citizen’s identity, like publication of 
private facts, threatens the private citizen’s anonymity, it also implicates a very 
different interest in autonomous self-definition.”276 That is, “because an 
individual bears uniquely any costs attendant to the meaning of her identity, 
she has an important interest in controlling uses of her identity that affect her 
ability to author that meaning.”277  
This interest, while important in the privacy context, appears to be 
equally relevant for individuals with public personas.278 In this way, McKenna 
would seek to distinguish between identity appropriation claims on one hand, 
and traditional privacy claims on the other—rather than claims between public 
figures and private citizens.279 As McKenna articulates it, “[b]ecause the things 
with which individuals choose to associate reflect the way they wish to be 
perceived, unauthorized use of one’s identity in connection with products or 
services threatens to define that individual to the world.”280 
Rather than protecting the actor’s mask in the vein of the psychoanalytic 
theory of persona, these personhood theories seek to extend the right of 
publicity to the inner, autonomous self—the actor—rather than the mask. Yet, 
 
 272. Id.  
 273. Id. at 421–22 (footnotes omitted). 
 274. McKenna, supra note 8, at 279. 
 275. See id. at 264 n.169. 
 276. Id. at 279. 
 277. Id.  
 278. Id. at 279–80. 
 279. Id. at 280. 
 280. Id. at 294. 
458 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:419 
in focusing on an inner, “true self,” these justifications presuppose that the self 
has an autonomous core—an “essential underlying identity”—rather than 
seeing the public image itself as a principle aspect of that identity.281 In this 
way, these theories retreat from viewing publicity as strictly outer, objective, 
and economic, to the other extreme in referring to it in relation to an isolated, 
subjective, and solitary inner self.282 But the existence of such a static core self 
may ultimately be an illusion.283 
The next Part suggests that right of publicity law pivot from the public-
private dualism that has plagued personality rights jurisprudence since Judge 
Frank decided Haelan. In place of that dualism, it urges a push toward 
intersubjectivity—a focus on the psychological relation between individuals as 
integral to the development of the self and personality.  
V.  PUBLICITY AND THE INTERSUBJECTIVE SELF  
In its focus on the image-as-object capable of being owned and 
transferred, post-Haelan publicity law views the personality from an objective 
third-person perspective—the perception of reality from outside the person. In 
contrast, given its focus on inner feelings, emotions, and dignity, privacy law 
tends to view the personality from a subjective, first-person perspective—the 
perception of reality from one’s own vantage point.284 While this dichotomy 
may be a convenient metaphor given its simplicity, it fails to accurately 
account for the dynamic and relational nature of the personality.  
To this end, this Part proposes that publicity law consider an alternate 
conception of the self that emphasizes intersubjectivity—that the personality 
develops by, and is dependent on, relationships between people.285 In effect, 
intersubjectivity shifts the concept of the self from noun to verb—from an 
isolated mind to an expressive communicative act.286 While the concept of 
intersubjectivity is not unique to psychoanalysis,287 given its focus on the 
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contextual nature of interactions between people, intersubjectivity has been 
proposed as an update to the classical psychoanalytic dualistic view of the self 
previously examined in Part III.288  
A. INTERSUBJECTIVITY THEORY 
As mentioned earlier, traditional psychoanalysis was pervaded by the 
Cartesian “Myth of the Isolated Individual Mind.”289 The philosophy of Rene 
Descartes severed mind from body, conceiving of the mind as a “thinking 
thing” with “an inside” that “looks out on an external world” from which it is 
essentially estranged.290 This metaphysical dualism “concretized the idea of a 
complete separation between mind and world, between subject and object.”291 
Inner reality—the private—is considered to be subjective and psychic. In 
contrast, outer reality—the public—is objective, material, and “extended in 
space.”292 The mind is seen as a container, with fantasies, ideas, emotions, 
drives, and instincts, separate from external, material reality.293 
Judge Frank’s judicial philosophy and psychoanalytic jurisprudence was 
consistent with the myth of the isolated mind. Consider, for example, Judge 
Frank’s statement that legal rules are just “psychology pulleys” or “psychical 
levers,”294 and his emphasis on separating “internal and external, psychical and 
physical, mind and body, subjective and objective.”295 “In psychoanalysis, this 
split appears in the contrast between psychic reality and external reality.”296 In 
terms of personality rights jurisprudence, we see the consequences of this 
dualism in the split between privacy—focused on inner reality and psychic 
harm—and publicity—focused on the material image and economic gain.  
This subject-object split between privacy and publicity mirrors the 
psychoanalytic dichotomy of false self (the public) and true self (the private) 
previously described. Yet this dichotomy has since been shown to be 
unrealistic.297 Rather, the self has more recently been found to be contextual in 
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nature. In Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis as Phenomenological Contextualism, 
Robert Stolorow explains that what we consider “the self” is the result of 
“emergent properties of ongoing dynamic intersubjective systems.”298 This 
intersubjectivity theory reformulates selfhood and personality in terms that 
more directly capture relational experience. That is, intersubjective 
psychoanalysis suggests that interactions should be considered contextually. 
For example, interactions between a patient and therapist, child and a parent, or 
other relationships are better analyzed as mutually influencing each other as 
opposed to in isolation.299 One’s “subjective emotional experience—is 
something that from birth onward is regulated, or mis-regulated, within 
ongoing relational systems.”300 An individual’s subjective experience of self is 
not autonomous or static, but instead is continually being constructed in the 
present out of past experiences and the current context in which the individual 
finds themselves.  
Unlike in the traditional psychoanalytic framework, intersubjectivity does 
not try to fit a person’s subjective experience into preexisting theoretical 
frameworks like id and ego, persona and shadow, true self and false self, or 
public and private.301 These categories are regarded in the intersubjective sense 
as metaphors, which may be helpful in understanding some people, in some 
situations, some of the time.302 Individuals “are not viewed as trying to hide or 
dress themselves up.”303 Their presentations are instead seen as “dynamic 
solutions” in navigating identity, relationships, and communities.304 Through 
these sorts of interpersonal experiences, the self develops. Thus, one’s 
personality “is always codetermined by features of the surround and the unique 
meanings into which these are assimilated.”305 
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B. PRIVACY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY  
The adoption of an intersubjective concept of the self has not yet been 
suggested in the context of the right of publicity. However, intersubjectivity is 
consistent with formulations of the self, already discussed by several 
prominent privacy theorists, to account for privacy norms as being applicable 
in private and public contexts alike.  
Invoking the concept of intersubjectivity specifically, Valerie Steeves has 
attempted to reconceptualize privacy “as a dynamic process of negotiating 
personal boundaries in intersubjective relations.”306 “[B]y placing privacy in 
the social context of intersubjectivity,” Steeves believes “privacy can be more 
fully understood . . . as we negotiate our relationships with others on a daily 
basis.”307 In drawing the boundaries between the self and others, privacy is 
“intersubjectively constituted through communication.”308 Privacy is thus 
applicable across both public and private spheres given that “privacy is what 
enables the self to see itself as a social object and to negotiate appropriate 
levels of openness and closedness to others.”309 Put differently, privacy can be 
considered intersubjectively as a “dynamic process” negotiated by social actors 
as they either withdraw into solitude, engage in intimate relations, or 
participate in broader social interactions.310 
While not dubbing their contextual approaches to understanding the self 
“intersubjectivity” explicitly, other leading privacy scholars’ theoretical 
accounts are consistent with its view of the self as a social and relational 
construct. For example, in his seminal article, Privacy, Intimacy, and 
Personhood, Jeffrey Reiman argues that the self is not innate, but instead 
“created in social interaction.”311 Put another way, the creation of identity is a 
social process that is ongoing rather than occurring only in childhood. 
According to Reimann, the existence of the self is dependent on the “social 
rituals” of privacy.312 He continues: 
The right to privacy is the right to the existence of a social practice which 
makes it possible for me to think of this existence as mine. This means that 
it is the right to conditions necessary for me to think of myself as the kind 
of entity for whom it would be meaningful and important to claim personal 
and property rights.313 
Julie Cohen, similarly, writes about a “postliberal,” socially constructed 
conception of the self as supportive of a dynamic right of privacy.314 Cohen’s 
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view of the self is in sharp contrast with the metaphorical division between 
public and private inherent in the psychoanalytic model. Privacy law (like 
publicity law) has long assumed that the self has “an autonomous core—an 
essential self identifiable after the residue of influence has been subtracted.”315 
Cohen believes, though, that “[t]he idea of privacy as a defense bulwark for the 
autonomous self is an artifact of a preexisting cultural construction.”316  
Rather, because “we are born and remain situated within social and 
cultural contexts,” the self who is the real subject of privacy law is a social 
construction which gradually emerges from a “preexisting cultural and 
relational substrate.”317 Cohen explains further: “Selfhood is a product of both 
social shaping and embodied experience. People are born into networks of 
relationships, practices, and beliefs, and those networks profoundly shape the 
processes of self-articulation.”318 
Helen Nissenbaum, through her theory of “contextual integrity,” also 
invokes an approach akin to intersubjectivity in its focus on transactions and 
relations.319 Nissenbaum explains that while “public and private define a 
dichotomy of spheres that have proven useful in legal and political inquiry,” 
privacy norms are rather “rooted in the details of rather more limited contexts, 
spheres, or stereotypic situations.”320 These transactional “contexts” or 
“spheres” include norms of informational (1) appropriateness—what 
information about individuals is appropriate to reveal in a certain context, and 
(2) distribution—the transfer or movement between individuals or parties.321 
According to Nissenbaum: 
[W]hether a particular action is determined a violation of privacy is a 
function of several variables, including the nature of the situation, or 
context; the nature of the information in relation to that context; the roles of 
agents receiving information; their relationship to information subjects; on 
what terms the information is shared by the subject; and the terms of further 
dissemination.322 
To the extent that privacy and publicity are acknowledged to once again 
be intertwined rights, the theoretical accounts of the intersubjective self in 
privacy also appear relevant to publicity law. Their applications to publicity 
might thus be explored in future scholarly works on the right of publicity. One 
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particular application is discussed in the final subpart below—the right of 
publicity as applied to “personal-public”323 spaces like social media. 
C. PUBLICITY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
Through analogy to intersubjectivity, this final subpart proposes a 
reframing of the right of publicity as a “data protection right.” That is, common 
law and statutory right of publicity laws could provide a tool for identity-
holders to be able to retain (but not necessarily own) certain control of their 
digital information as they navigate online relationships and communities.324 
Under an intersubjective approach, the self is constructed through social 
relationships. It follows, then, that the right of publicity should not be 
diametrically opposed to privacy. Intersubjectivity shifts the concept of 
selfhood from a noun to verb; from an isolated mind to an expressive 
communicative act.325 Thus, the extent to which the self is revealed or 
concealed, embedded or withdrawn, from social relations is part of the same 
act or phenomenon under both privacy and publicity.326 In this way, publicity, 
like privacy, may be conceptualized not just as protecting static objective or 
subjective identity, but as a dynamic social construction used in negotiating a 
broad range of social relations with others, both in the physical world, as well 
as in the digital and social media context.327 
1. A Data Protection Right  
In Jennifer Rothman’s recent book, The Right of Publicity: Privacy 
Reimagined for a Public World, she imagines privacy and publicity as 
intertwined rights, “protecting individuals’ identities rather than protecting a 
separable, purely economic interest.”328 To this end, Rothman believes that 
public and private figures should be able to recover for both financial and 
personal injuries, and that the right of publicity should have reasonable limits 
to its alienability.329 Rothman argues that it has “done a disservice to public 
figures to deny the possibility that they too suffer dignitary and emotional 
harms from nonconsensual uses of their identities.”330 In spite of claims to the 
contrary, the objections of public figures are not solely pecuniary in nature, nor 
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should they be made to pretend as if they are.331 Such an economic 
requirement minimizes injuries to public figures and dehumanizes them.332 On 
the other hand, private figures should not be barred from bringing right of 
publicity claims simply because their personas lack commercial value, while 
they are simultaneously prohibited from bringing claims based on privacy 
because they let their personas enter the public sphere.333  
To this end, Rothman proposes that right of publicity laws should provide 
minimum statutory damages to protect private figures without commercially 
valuable identities, when economic damages would be small, nonexistent, or 
difficult to prove.334 A reimagined right of publicity could address problems 
such as revenge porn, mugshot websites charging fees for the removal of 
photos and, as will be the focus of the remainder of this Article, social media 
providers’ use of its users’ personas for advertising, endorsement, and data 
harvesting purposes.335 As Rothman puts it, the “[d]istinctions between public 
and private figures make little sense today as so-called private figures 
increasingly live public or quasi-public lives on Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, 
Pinterest, Periscope, and other online fora.”336 
This proposed integration of privacy and publicity rights is increasingly 
important as the distance between private and public spaces dwindle and 
modern media blurs the boundaries between the two.337 To this end, the rise of 
personal-public networked spaces, most notably social media, allow 
individuals to connect on social planes that challenge the conventional divide 
between public and private.338 While in Judge Frank’s time, it was logical to 
separate public figures from private individuals, that distinction is less obvious 
in networked spaces where individuals display, record, and archive their 
performances of self and personality. For example, consider the phenomenon 
of social media “influencers”—users of social media who are not necessarily 
celebrities per se, but have established social influence in a given industry or 
social sphere and are paid to market and endorse products or services.339  
In terms of intersubjectivity, social networks allow individuals to 
construct and reconstruct their identities into “fluid and situational-based 
identities” depending on the social network they are using and the audience 
 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Right of Publicity: Privacy Reimagined for New York? 36 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J., 573, 588–92 (2018).  
 336. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 183. 
 337. See, e.g., Zizi Papacharissi & Paige L. Gibson, Fifteen Minutes of Privacy: Privacy, Sociality, and 
Publicity on Social Network Sites, in PRIVACY ONLINE: PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVACY AND SELF-DISCLOSURE IN 
THE SOCIAL WEB 75 (Sabine Trepte & Leonard Reinecke eds., 2011). 
 338. Id. 
 339. See, e.g., Kevin Roose, Don’t Scoff at Influencers. They’re Taking Over the World., N.Y. TIMES (July 
16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/16/technology/vidcon-social-media-influencers.html. 
February 2020] UNMASKING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 465 
they are targeting.340 In this manner, new media enables “[t]he self to traverse[] 
from privacy and publicity and back by cultivating a variety of social 
behaviors or performances.”341 Some of these performances, even among 
otherwise private figures, are widely seen—perhaps even “going viral.” These 
individuals, who are not typically wealthy or otherwise famous, might have 
emotional, reputational, and/or economic attachments to these identities. Julie 
Cohen describes the conceptualization of an individual’s identity within a 
networked space as “a nexus of social practice by embodied human beings.”342 
Yet, social networks have been called a “science fiction nightmare” given 
their ability to gather, misuse, and abuse user data.343 Perhaps the right of 
publicity could be used as a legal mechanism for preventing the misuse and 
abuse of such data. It might also be justified in encouraging identity formation 
across social media and other digital technologies and new media such as 
virtual worlds and communities, websites (especially regarding user-generated 
content), blogs, podcasts, and online videos.  
In attempting a reworked justification for the right of publicity, we might 
then consider the social dynamics of new media. To this end, James 
Grimmelmann has examined three factors of social networking consistent with 
intersubjectivity: (1) identity, (2) relationship, and (3) community.344 
As to the first goal, “identity,” social network users’ online profiles allow 
them to cultivate a persona that influences how others think of them.345 Online 
interactions allow new media users to use their posted name or nickname, 
home or profile page, photos, and written postings to this effect. Social media 
profiles allow users to communicate “prestige, differentiation, authenticity, and 
theatrical persona” through use of a common cultural language.346 In this way, 
“social-network-site profiles are wholly social artifacts: controlled impressions 
for a specific audience, as much performative as informative.”347  
The second goal, “relationship,” refers to the capacity of social networks 
to allow users to deepen their connections to their current friends and make 
new ones.348 Social networks can provide contexts for interaction as well as 
help to transmit social cues that facilitate offline interactions. To this end, 
social networks “work for relationship building because they also provide 
semi-public, explicit ways to enact relationships.”349 Sharing personal 
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information is a central component of intimacy, for example, adding contacts 
gives someone access to your profile information, a minor form of intimacy 
which signals trust.350 
The third goal, “community,” allows individuals to establish a social 
position and to be recognized as a valued member of various digital 
communities.351 Social media allows individuals to visualize digital 
communities. By representing relationships as hyperlinks, websites “spatialize 
social networks, mapping the connections within them.”352 It therefore 
becomes possible to conceptualize an individual’s identity within a networked 
space, such as a digital community.  
In considering these idealized goals of social networking, the right of 
publicity might be justified as a vehicle for regulating and promoting not only 
user identity, but also digital relationships and communities. As examples of 
the intersubjective self at work in the right of publicity context, consider the 
Fraley v. Facebook and Perkins v. LinkedIn litigations.353 Both cases illustrate 
the recent trend toward right of publicity litigation in the context of social 
media,354 which has had the effect of bringing the “right of publicity to the 
masses.”355 Fraley and Perkins involved issues such as whether the right of 
publicity should (1) allow for recovery for personal and reputational as well as 
financial injuries, (2) apply to both public and private figures, and (3) what 
constitutes appropriate legal consent as to the transfer of one’s identity to third 
parties.  
Fraley and Perkins highlight the need for a recasting of the right of 
publicity’s focus from commodity to intersubjectivity. In other words, a focus 
not merely on the economic harm to the identity-holder, but also in terms of 
facilitating the quality of social interactions and relationship dynamics between 
the identity-holder and the (digital) community as a whole. In this way, the 
right would not only be viewed as protecting the personas of celebrities, as in 
the Carson, White, and Midler cases discussed in Part I,356 but can also serve to 
effectively regulate the social dynamics associated with digital technologies 
and new media. The right could then allow for a certain amount of user online 
identity control absent the creation of a separate property right in data, which 
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would vest intellectual property rights in users’ information about 
themselves.357 
Both Fraley and Perkins involved class actions lawsuits brought under 
California’s right of publicity statute, California Civil Code section 3344, 
which reads, in part: 
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or 
goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, 
products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person’s prior 
consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or 
persons injured as a result thereof.358 
In Fraley, the plaintiffs—Facebook users—brought a putative class 
action lawsuit under California’s right of publicity statute against Facebook, 
Inc. The claim involved the use of plaintiffs’ names and likenesses in 
Facebook’s “Sponsored Stories” feature.359 As part of Sponsored Stories, 
Facebook used its users’ names and images in paid advertisements 
broadcasting to the users’ friends that the user had “liked” certain companies 
or brands, for example, “Angel Frolicker likes Rosetta Stone.”360 According to 
plaintiffs, these misleading endorsements conflicted with how users wanted to 
present themselves online. Plaintiffs alleged that they did not know that the use 
of the “Like” button would be “interpreted and publicized by Facebook as an 
endorsement of those advertisers, products, services, or brands.”361  
In Perkins, similarly, a class of plaintiffs alleged that LinkedIn 
Corporation—creators of the popular professional networking platform—
violated their right of publicity by harvesting email addresses from the contact 
lists of email accounts associated with plaintiffs’ LinkedIn accounts, as well as 
by sending repeated invitations to join LinkedIn to the harvested email 
addresses.362 Specifically, Perkins involved a challenge to LinkedIn’s use of a 
service called “Add Connections,” which allows LinkedIn users to import 
contacts from their external email accounts and email connection invitations to 
their contacts inviting them to connect on LinkedIn, using Plaintiffs’ names 
and likenesses in the endorsement emails (for example, “I’d like to add you to 
my professional network—Paul Perkins”).363 Upon receiving a member’s 
authorization, LinkedIn would send an invitation email to the member’s email 
contacts who were not already LinkedIn members. If that connection invitation 
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was not accepted within a certain amount of time, up to two additional emails 
are sent reminding the recipient that the connection invite is pending.364  
Based on the right of publicity’s commercial focus, plaintiffs in both 
cases had difficulties recovering because (1) as private figures, their personas 
had little financial value for assessing injury, and (2) they had assigned their 
rights of publicity—their personas—to Facebook and LinkedIn, for advertising 
and endorsement purposes based on a click-through consent to each platform’s 
respective terms of service. Each set of terms contained a broad publicity 
license in exchange for each user’s use of the platforms. 
2. A Flexible Theory of Harm  
As to the injury alleged, the Fraley court explained that California’s right 
of publicity—despite being one of a minority of jurisdictions to actually 
incorporate statutory damages for non-economic injuries—was primarily a 
vehicle to prevent the commercial use and protect the economic value of the 
persona.365 Plaintiffs were thus limited to alleging economic rather than 
emotional harm.366 According to the district court: 
Plaintiffs here do not allege that their personal browsing histories have 
economic value to advertisers wishing to target advertisements at Plaintiffs 
themselves, nor that their demographic information has economic value for 
general marketing and analytics purposes. Rather, they allege that their 
individual, personalized endorsements of products, services, and brands to 
their friends and acquaintances has concrete, provable value in the 
economy at large, which can be measured by the additional profit Facebook 
earns from selling Sponsored Stories compared to its sale of regular 
advertisements. . . . Based on these concrete allegations, Plaintiffs assert 
that they have a tangible property interest in their personal endorsement of 
Facebook advertisers’ products to their Facebook Friends, and that 
Facebook has been unlawfully profiting from the nonconsensual 
exploitation of Plaintiffs’ statutory right of publicity.367 
Yet, had plaintiffs also been allowed to plead mental or reputational 
harm, they would have had a stronger case. Consider that the motivation of 
plaintiffs, social media users, was primarily for intersubjective—social 
identity, relationship, and community—benefit, not economic gain.368 In this 
light, the right of publicity as an economic creature seems to be a “clumsy 
tool” to redress plaintiffs’ injuries.369 If right of publicity law was receptive to 
it, plaintiffs could have argued, beyond unjust enrichment, that the misleading 
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endorsements simply conflicted with how Facebook or LinkedIn users wanted 
to present themselves online in terms of their relationships with others and 
their resulting status in the digital community.  
For example, the facts in Fraley indicated that plaintiffs routinely clicked 
“Like” on the Facebook pages of brands and companies for purposes other 
than to express support for them. When Facebook and LinkedIn broadcasted 
misleading endorsements in Sponsored Stories and Add Connections, it 
conflicted with users’ values (identity), their ability to build digital connections 
(relationship), and their corresponding social positions on the network 
(community). As one commentator points out as to the plaintiffs in Fraley: 
Such messages [by Facebook] could have caused users non-economic harm 
in the form of humiliation and impairment of reputation by presenting them 
to their “friends” as proponents of brands and companies that they did not 
in fact endorse. Moreover, if users had restricted the visibility of the 
“Likes” section of their profile to only certain “friends” or to no one but 
themselves, the broadcasting of these “Likes” through “Sponsored Stories” 
would certainly have caused them embarrassment and feelings of 
powerlessness as their selected privacy settings led to a greater expectation 
of privacy. The unavailability of an option to opt-out of social marketing 
paired with the lack of transparency about what happens when a user clicks 
the “Like” button strengthens the support for a finding of non-economic 
harm.370 
In Perkins, Plaintiffs similarly alleged that LinkedIn had used their names 
and likenesses to personally endorse LinkedIn’s services for its commercial 
benefit and to the detriment of plaintiffs.371 Unlike in Fraley, plaintiffs here 
attempted to plead reputational harm in addition to economic harm. As 
evidence for harm to users’ reputations, in a message thread on LinkedIn’s 
Help Center, one user described LinkedIn’s Add Connections process as 
“deceptive, misleading and purposely vague.”372 Other users stated that they 
were “‘extremely upset at the repercussions’ of LinkedIn’s ‘hacking,’” and that 
“LinkedIn should stop the spammy practices of sending out invitations to 
people’s address book without their explicit request to do so.”373 Another user 
wrote: “There is a specific group of people whom I absolutely must avoid for 
ethical reasons. This feature has sent out invitations on its own initiative twice, 
and my first notice each time was that one of these people ‘accepted’ my 
invitations. Terrible.”374 Yet, another user wrote: “[A]t this point I’m finding 
LinkedIn more of a problem in terms of hurting my reputation than helping it. 
What’s more the invitations are NOT people in my address book. They are 
people I don’t know. I find this entire issue extremely unprofessional on 
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[LinkedIn’s] part. You would think with all these members with the same 
problem [that LinkedIn] would respond with a fix.”375  
But despite this evidence, Plaintiffs ran into difficulties in pleading 
reputational injury. Consistent with the subject-object split between private and 
public personality rights, the court cited precedent distinguishing “injury to the 
character or reputation” from “‘injury to the feelings’ resulting from harm to 
one’s reputation.”376 While California’s right of publicity statute is one of the 
few that allows minimum statutory damages for mental harm, the district court 
held that it could not compensate for reputational harm.377 Rather, plaintiffs 
could only be compensated for the “effect any such reputational harm might 
have on one’s feelings” and emotions.378 Thus, the non-economic injury in this 
case could not comprise the actual injury to plaintiffs’ reputations, but rather 
only the uncertainty and worry regarding these reputations.379  
In other words, the court fell for the Cartesian “myth of the isolated 
mind.”380 The harm alleged had to relate solely to the plaintiffs’ inner mental 
state alone, instead of more accurately being conceptualized as the 
intersubjective harm to the identities, relationships, and community between 
and among users of the social network. The right of publicity’s economic 
focus, and its difficulty in weighing non-market considerations such as 
reputation, seriously limits the remedies available to new media users and 
other private figures whose identities do not have readily measurable 
commercial value but who attempt to seek recourse for the unauthorized use of 
their personas.381 An approach that focuses not just on the profit or benefit the 
misappropriating party received, but also on the harm—economic, 
reputational, and mental—incurred by the violated party would better 
conceptualize the wrongdoing done to plaintiffs.382 
3. A Heightened Standard of Consent  
Beyond harm, another aspect of the intersubjective approach to the right 
of publicity involves the element of consent. Of the right of publicity’s three 
major elements—(1) use of an individual’s persona; (2) for commercial 
purposes; (3) without plaintiffs consent—the latter has so far been 
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undertheorized.383 Facebook and LinkedIn had argued that Plaintiffs had 
consented to use of their names and likenesses in advertising by agreeing to its 
Terms of Service.384 According to the Fraley court, for example, Plaintiffs 
“faced a substantial hurdle in proving a lack of consent, either express or 
implied. While those issues could not be adjudicated in Facebook’s favor at the 
pleading stage, there was a significant risk that at some later juncture, plaintiffs 
would be found to have consented.”385  
As a result of the settlement in Fraley and Perkins, which otherwise 
involved a modest payout to class members,386 Facebook and LinkedIn simply 
amended their terms of service to explicitly include consent for use of users’ 
personas for advertising or endorsement purposes. For example, a recent 
version of Facebook’s Terms of Service reads: 
You give us permission to use your name and profile picture and 
information about actions you have taken on Facebook next to or in 
connection with ads, offers, and other sponsored content that we display 
across our Products, without any compensation to you. For example, we 
may show your friends that you are interested in an advertised event or 
have liked a Page created by a brand that has paid us to display its ads on 
Facebook.387 
Courts have since found this boilerplate consent provision enforceable, 
even in the context of minors who use the platform.388 Thus, while the 
plaintiffs in Fraley and Perkins scored a small moral victory by demonstrating 
that private figures can successfully assert right of publicity claims, social 
media platforms were able to draft their way out of liability for right of 
publicity violations via disclosures in their terms of service.389 As a result, 
right of publicity claims have since dried up in the context of social media. The 
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right of publicity is thus able to do little to lessen the unequal power dynamics 
between the users of new media and social networking platforms. 
Had plaintiffs been able to demonstrate stronger showings of harm and 
lack of consent, though, the settlement might have resulted in Facebook or 
LinkedIn providing a proper opt-out, or preferably opt-in, regime. Users would 
then be able to opt-out or opt-in to “Add Connections” or “Sponsored Stories” 
on a notification-by-notification basis. This is the sort of meaningful control 
that would foster intersubjective relations—stronger control of identity 
formation and the strengthening of digital relationships and communities. On 
the other hand, blanket consent to advertising and endorsement programs 
generally is meaningless, as users will not be able to predict what brand, 
company, or user of whom they might be forced to broadcast an 
endorsement.390 
Future commentary might then focus on what constitutes adequate 
consent for purposes of the transfer of one’s personality. While imposing 
outright limits on the right of publicity’s free transferability is one option, e.g., 
preventing the transferability of the right of publicity via total assignment,391 
courts or (especially) legislators could alternatively consider a heightened 
standard of consent in this regard.392 Commentators, such as Margaret Jane 
Radin, in her groundbreaking work Boilerplate, have put forth significant 
arguments that language in terms of service, which many website users will 
never read, should not be enough to constitute consent to a license of 
something as integral as publication of one’s identity for blanket use in 
advertising.393  
Perhaps social networks and other new media should be required under 
the law to obtain the knowing consent of its users on a notification-by-
notification basis before it can use their personas for capitalistic purposes. Just 
as it is in privacy law,394 the appropriate standard of consent should be a 
subject of controversy as to the right of publicity. We might therefore look, for 
example, to principles of informed consent in the medical context or 
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affirmative consent in feminist legal theory,395 in fashioning publicity consent 
laws. 
In these and other ways, recasting the right of publicity through an 
intersubjective lens might allow the right to contribute to the development of 
not just the self, but of digital data-based relationships and community. A far 
cry from publicity’s commonly held stereotype as a hedonic vehicle bolstering 
the rights of already wealthy celebrities and trampling over the First 
Amendment.396  
CONCLUSION 
No one can literally answer the metaphysical question of what the self is. 
However, we can come up with a better metaphor of the personality for 
purposes of the law which is more effective than what we currently have. The 
extent to which the right of publicity should be alienable, whether it should 
allow claims for emotional and reputational harms as well as economic ones, 
and what constitutes adequate consent for its transfer, are a few important 
issues that depend on what our view of the self and personality are. To this 
end, the subject-object split common to traditional psychoanalytic thought is 
insufficient in considering the modern intertwined need for privacy and 
publicity. Intersubjective personality theory, in viewing the self as contextual, 
relational, and dependent on social interaction, provides a useful conceptual 
update, including in the context of navigating identity, relationships, and 
community on new media. Whether he did so consciously or unconsciously, 
Judge Frank’s metaphorical separation of publicity from privacy need no 
longer haunt personality rights jurisprudence. 
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